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THE PROBLEMS WITH SETOFF: A PROPOSED
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK*
ABSTRACT
This Article explores the current status of the law of setoff in
this country. It first briefly examines the history of setoff, details
where and when it arises, and explains its importance. The Article
then illustrates the .different ways in which states have approached
some of the complex issues presented by setoff and determines
which approaches appear best. Finally, presuming the need for in-
creased uniformity, the Article proposes a draft Uniform Setoff Act
and an "Official Comment" thereto.
INTRODUCTION
The Origins of Setoff
In its most basic form, setoff is the cancellation of cross de-
mands, that is, the satisfaction of all or part of a debt owed by X
to Y through the simultaneous discharge or forgiveness of a debt
due to X from Y. Setoff began in ancient Rome with the doctrine
of compensatio.1 During the time of Gaius, setoff was limited to
certain claims arising out of the same contract and its use re-
mained a matter of judicial discretion.2 Under Marcus Aurelius
and Justinian, the doctrine was expanded to include claims arising
* A.B. 1981, Brown University; J.D. 1984, Boston University; LL.M. in Taxation 1987,
New York University. Mr. Sepinuck is an associate in the San Francisco office of Orrick,
Herrington & Sutcliffe and a member of the Florida, Massachusetts, California, and District
of Columbia bars.
1. Loyd, The Development of Set-Off, 64 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 541 (1916). Although pub-
lished more than seventy years ago, this article remains the most thorough and carefully
researched treatise on the history of the setoff doctrine.
2. Comment, Automatic Extinction of Cross-Demands: Compensation from Rome to Cal-
ifornia, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 224, 229-30 (1965).
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from different transactions and was extended to reach both real
and personal actions. 3
Eventually, the doctrine made its way to France, where it can be
traced to the fourteenth century. In England, however, the doc-
trine generated less enthusiasm. Under the English legal system,
the forms of action and the system of pleadings were designed to
bring opposing parties to a single issue, affirmed on one side and
denied on the other. Interjection of a collateral issue or claim ran
counter to this basic philosophy and must have seemed intolera-
ble.4 Nevertheless, some early courts of chancery, exercising equi-
table jurisdiction and conscious of the unfairness of denying setoff
against parties with few or dwindling financial resources, found a
basis for setoff outside the formalities of law. They also recognized
its concomitant benefit of avoiding circuity and multiplicity of
suits.,
In 1705, the doctrine finally received legislative support through
a temporary bankruptcy statute.' It reemerged in 1729, as part of
an act reforming debtors' prisons and insolvency proceedings. This
time the doctrine had a much broader application, extending be-
yond insolvency proceedings and applying generally:
[w]here there are mutual Debts between the Plaintiff and De-
fendant .... one Debt may be set against the other, and such
Matter may be given in Evidence upon the General Issue, or
pleaded in Bar, as the Nature of the Case shall require, so as at
the Time of his pleading the General Issue, where any such Debt
of the Plaintiff ... is intended to be insisted on in Evidence,
Notice shall be given of the particular Sum or Debt so intended
to be insisted on, and upon what Account it became due.'
3. Loyd, supra note 1, at 541-42; Comment, supra note 2, at 231, 234. At this early age, at
least one modern question originated: are mutual claims extinguished automatically as a
matter of law, or is some further action, such as an agreement between the parties or a
judicial decree, necessary to effect the result? Loyd, supra note 1, at 542-43; see infra note
33 and accompanying text.
4. Loyd, supra note 1, at 543-44.
5. Morton, Creditor Setoffs in Business Reorganization and Relief Cases Under the
Bankruptcy Act, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373, 374 (1976).
6. 4 Anne, ch. 17, § 11 (1705) (providing that the creditors of a bankrupt who owe him a
debt would not be compelled to pay more than the balance due after adjusting the account).
7. 2 Geo. 2, ch. 22, § 13 (1729).
The term "mutual debts" suggested to some that this provision was restricted to claims
arising from the same transaction. Yet, when this act was made perpetual in 1735, an
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Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, set-
off was available only in judicial proceedings and remained subject
to all the formalities of English law.'
Surprisingly, setoff on this side of the Atlantic predates the Eng-
lish statutes. As early as 1645, the colony of Virginia permitted
civil defendants to set off debts due to and debts owing from a
plaintiff. By 1654, Maryland had followed with a similar measure
for discounting debts. In 1682, Pennsylvania added its own version,
one somewhat more comprehensive than the subsequent English
legislation. Moreover, as reenacted shortly after the turn of the
eighteenth century, the Pennsylvania statute permitted a defend-
ant to obtain affirmative relief if, after setoff, he remained a credi-
tor of the plaintiff.9
New York adopted its own statute in 1714, largely identical to
the Pennsylvania act, but requiring that written notice of the off-
setting debt be given with the responsive plea.10 In 1722, New
Jersey enacted its version, closely tracking the New York statute,
but also requiring that the defendant plead his setoff "or else for-
ever after be barred of bringing any action for that which he might
or ought to have pleaded by virtue of this act."" Although certain
formalities remained for some time, 2 these acts evidently evolved
amendment providing that mutual debts could be set off notwithstanding that they were
deemed "to be of a different nature" removed this ambiguity. 8 Geo. 2, ch. 24, § 5 (1735).
8. See Stooke v. Taylor, 5 Q.B.D. 569, 575 (1880). There, the court said:
By the Statutes of Set off this plea is available only where the claims on both
sides are in respect of liquidated debts, or money demands which can be read-
ily and without difficulty ascertained. The plea can only be used in the way of
defense to the plaintiff's action, as a shield, not as a sword. Though the de-
fendant succeeded in proving a debt exceeding the plaintiff's demand, he was
not entitled to recover the excess; the effect was only to defeat the plaintiff's
action, the same as though the debt proved had been equal to the amount of
the claim established by the plaintiff, and no more.
9. See Loyd, supra note 1, at 557.
10. See id. at 558 n.75.
11. See id. at 560.
12. In addition to being generally restricted to liquidated claims, setoff also was appar-
ently restricted to contract and debt obligations. A defendant could raise tort claims (other
than through a separate suit) only under the doctrine of recoupment, which developed later.
The doctrine foreclosed affirmative relief and was limited to loss or damage arising from the
same transaction as the plaintiff's claim. See id. at 562-63, and cases cited therein; see also
Brown v. Patterson, 214 Ala. 351, 108 So. 16 (1926); Bates v. Lanier, 75 Fla. 79, 77 So. 628
(1918).
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into the permissive and compulsory counterclaims present in mod-
ern American pleading systems.
Setoff thus began as an innovative pleading tool. Yet, with the
advent of the liberal pleading rules embodied in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, much of the original purpose and early com-
plexities of setoff have vanished. Still, the spirit and substance of
setoff lives on, now outside the courtroom and the narrow confines
of pleading formalities. Setoff has become a widely recognized area
of substantive law.
The Current Uses of Setoff
Although the precise actions necessary to effect setoff are un-
clear, setoff can now certainly be effected without judicial involve-
ment.'" The circumstances under which privately effected setoff
may arise are quite varied. For example, merchants occasionally
set off the account debts generated when they buy from and sell to
each other. 4 More frequently, banks will use account deposits to
set off overdue loans made to their depositors.' 5 In fact, in reliance
13. For sample legislative authority, see 26 U.S.C. § 6402(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986);
U.C.C. § 4-303 (1978) (implying a bank right that may be exercised unilaterally). For cases
involving setoff prior to litigation, see Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. United States, 657 F.2d 36
(3d Cir. 1981) (based on Pennsylvania law); Baker v. National City Bank, 511 F.2d 1016
(6th Cir. 1975) (based on Ohio law); In re Saugus Gen. Hosp., 7 Bankr. 347 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 698 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1983) (based on Massachusetts law).
These cases discuss the action necessary to accomplish setoff. Nonjudicial setoff is not a
recent phenomenon; it dates back many decades. See First Nat'l Bank v. Coplen, 39 Cal.
App. 619, 179 P. 708 (1919). Indeed, early cases held that the failure to timely effect setoff
could discharge a guarantor. See, e.g., Tatum v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 193 Ala.
120, 69 So. 508 (1915). But see Mitchell, The Negative Pledge Clause and the Classification
of Financial Devices, 60 AM. BANK& L.J. 153, 167 (1986) (commenting that debts between
nonbanks cannot be set off without judicial action or mutual consent in most jurisdictions).
14. See, e.g., Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Southwire Co., 713 F.2d 684 (11th Cir.
1983) (setoff attempted between copper dealer and copper scrap dealer).
15. Funds deposited in a general checking or savings account become property of the
bank, and the depositor becomes merely a creditor of the bank for the amount in the ac-
count. Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d 631, 637 (9th Cir.
1977) (based on California law); United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101,
1103-05 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977) (based on Georgia law); Jensen v.
State Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1975) (based on Iowa law); In re Comprop Inv. Proper-
ties, Ltd., 81 Bankr. 101, 103 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987) (based on Florida law); In re Saugus
Gen. Hosp., 7 Bankr. at 350 (based on Massachusetts law); Fleischmann v. Mercantile Trust
Co., 617 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Mo. 1981); In re Elsinore Shore Assocs., 67 Bankr. 926, 936 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1986) (based on New Jersey law); Industrial Comm'r v. Five Corners Tavern, Inc. 47
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upon their ability to effect setoff swiftly, banks occasionally require
borrowers of large sums to maintain their deposit accounts with
the lending institution.'
Even when setoff arises during litigation, courts no longer treat
it as a procedural device but instead recognize it as a substantive
right." The exact nature and scope of this right is varied and un-
clear. Yet, setoff undeniably affects the priority of creditors and,
therefore, remains a significant concern in structuring commercial
transactions.
The Importance of Setoff
The importance of setoff perhaps is best demonstrated when one
party to a pair of mutual debts becomes bankrupt or insolvent. In
such a case, when a debtor lacks the ability to fully satisfy his
debt, setoff becomes more than a mere alternative to bringing suit
to enforce an obligation. It frequently becomes the only means by
which a creditor can fully collect.
The general scheme of modern bankruptcy law requires that the
bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession 18 marshal all of the
bankrupt's unencumbered assets before distributing assets to cred-
itors with unsecured claims. This action includes collecting debts
owed to the bankrupt. In a reorganization proceeding, these assets
then are used by the debtor-in-possession to generate additional
assets for later distribution to creditors. In a liquidation, the trus-
tee sells the assets and distributes the proceeds to creditors in
N.Y.2d 639, 645 n.2, 393 N.E.2d 1005, 1007 n.2, 419 N.Y.S.2d 931, 934 n.2 (1979); Sears v.
Continental Bank & Trust Co., 562 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Tex. 1977).
If the bank also has an outstanding loan to the depositor, the paradigm of the joint credi-
tor/debtor relationship necessary for setoff exists. Presumably because joint creditor/debtor
status is created most readily in this setting, bank setoff comprises more than half of the
setoff litigation.
16. See the security arrangements in In re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1980);
Glenn Justice Mortgage Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1979).
17. This is particularly evident when setoff is claimed in total or partial defense to a writ
of garnishment. In most jurisdictions, the substantive right of setoff defeats the rights of a
garnishor. See infra note 101 and accompanying text. Many states also have statutes creat-
ing various substantive setoff rights. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 44-11-11 (1983) (pro-
viding banks with a general lien upon deposits).
18. "Debtor-in-possession" is a term of art, defined in 11 U.S.C § 1101(1) (1982) to in-
clude almost every debtor in a reorganization proceeding. A debtor-in-possession generally
has all the powers of a trustee in a liquidation proceeding. Id. § 1107(a).
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what is supposed to be a more expedited fashion. In both cases,
creditors are divided into classes and arranged in a hierarchy spec-
ified by statute.'9 The equitable distribution that the Bankruptcy
Code then seeks to effect requires that no creditor in a class re-
ceive a greater percentage of his claim than any other creditor in
the same or higher class.
In theory, therefore, one who is both a creditor and a debtor of
the bankrupt will be compelled to pay his debt in full, and then
receive payment with his class on what is likely to be only a small
percentage of his claim. Setoff permits a creditor to avoid this ba-
sic scheme of the Bankruptcy Code by netting out his claim and
his debt. °
Not surprisingly, several courts have noted that the availability
of setoff seems to run counter to the fundamental policy underly-
ing bankruptcy law: a fair and proportionate distribution to credi-
tors.2 ' For this reason, some courts have prohibited its exercise
19. See id. §§ 507, 510, 1122.
20. Id. §§ 542(b), 553; see also id. §§ 741(6), 751, 752(a) (providing for distribution of net
claims to the customers of bankrupt stockbrokers).
Setoff not only permits a creditor to recover effectively a greater portion of his claim, but
to recover it in a much more timely fashion. Although the automatic bankruptcy stay pre-
vents creditors from effecting setoff after the bankruptcy petition is filed, id. § 362(a)(7), a
creditor "with a right to setoff is entitled to relief from the stay, unless [his] interest is
adequately protected." In re Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc., 24 Bankr. 256, 265
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1982). Moreover, unless subject to a preference attack under § 553(b),
discussed infra note 25, setoff effected prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition is not
subject to the stay provisions. E.g., In re Jefferson Mortgage Co., 25 Bankr. 963, 971 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1982); In re Compton Corp., 22 Bankr. 276, 277-78 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); In re
Donato, 17 Bankr. 708, 709 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982).
21. See Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 473-74 (1974) (acknowledging that
setoff during bankruptcy is a form of priority that prefers some creditors over others and is
thus contrary to bankruptcy policy); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 185
(1977) ("Setoff is an interruption in the conduct of business, and may have detrimental
effects on the attempted reorganization"); Note, Inequality or Equality Among Creditors?
The Second Circuit Preserves the Right of Setoff: In re Applied Logic Corp., 11 CONN. L.
REv. 601, 605 (1979) (suggesting that prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, a trend
towards restricting setoff rights was developing in the courts).
This Article takes no position on whether setoff should remain available in bankruptcy
proceedings (or generally exempt from attack as a preference, see infra note 25). The expan-
sive scope of setoff adopted by the legislation proposed at the end of this Article need not
require expansive application in bankruptcy. If such a change in bankruptcy policy were
desirable, the Bankruptcy Code could be modified easily to restrict or abolish setoff. This
result would appear preferable to modifying the legislation proposed here, which has wide
application and use outside of the area of bankruptcy.
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against a debtor undergoing a bankruptcy reorganization.22 Never-
theless, because setoff is firmly grounded in fundamental notions
of fairness, it has been incorporated in every United States bank-
ruptcy statute.23 Most courts now permit setoff absent "compelling
circumstances, ' 24 and treat it essentially as a security interest,
rather than as the equitable remedy of its origin.25 Accordingly, a
creditor owing a mutual debt available for setoff is entitled to ade-
quate protection of his claim or relief from the automatic stay.26
22. E.g., In re Utica Floor Maintenance, Inc., 31 Bankr. 509, 512 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1983).
There, the court stated:
[t]o remove further working capital from the Debtor at this time by way of
setoff would result in jeopardizing the Debtor's prospects for a successful reor-
ganization. It would deprive the Debtor of the protection of Chapter 11 when it
needs it most. To permit setoff would be inconsistent with Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code and not in the best interest of any of the creditors.
23. Comment, Bank Insolvency and Depositor Setoff, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 188, 192 &
nn.23-24 (1984).
24. E.g., In re Inslaw, Inc., 81 Bankr. 169, 170 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1987); In re Springfield
Casket Co., 21 Bankr. 223, 228 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Allbrand Appliance & Televi-
sion Co., 16 Bankr. 10, 14-15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982) ("An allowed claim of a creditor... that is subject to setoff
under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim ... to the extent of the amount subject to
setoff"); see also In re Compton Corp., 22 Bankr. 276, 277 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) ("The
Bankruptcy Reform Act carries into current practice the prevailing pre-Code concept of
viewing a setoff claim as a form of security interest"); Freeman, Setoff Under the New
Bankruptcy Code: The Effect on Bankers, 97 BANKING L.J. 484, 486, 519-22 (1980); Com-
ment, Setoff in Bankruptcy: Is the Creditor Preferred or Secured?, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 511,
526 (1979).
The Code's policy against preferences also illustrates this point. To effectuate the bank-
ruptcy purpose of equitable distribution, the bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession is
empowered to rescind almost any transaction made within the 90 days preceding the bank-
ruptcy filing that has the effect of preferring one creditor over others in the same or higher
class. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). To this end, a transfer or perfection of a
security interest can be an avoidable preference. See id. § 101(48) (defining transfer). A
transfer in satisfaction of a valid security interest, however, perfected more than 90 days
before the filing, generally will not constitute an avoidable preference. Setoff rights are
treated similarly. If a creditor incurs a debt to the bankrupt within the 90 day period so
that setoff can extinguish the creditor's claim against the bankruptcy estate, setoff will be
denied. Id. § 553(a)(3). Moreover, setoff effected within the 90 days preceding the filing may
be partially or totally avoided if the creditor's debt to the bankrupt was increased during
that time. Id. § 553(b). Yet, the exercise of setoff to satisfy a claim with a debt incurred
more than 90 days before the bankruptcy fling will not be subject to a preference attack.
26. E.g., In re Williams, 61 Bankr. 567, 571 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); In re Dartmouth
House Nursing Home, Inc., 24 Bankr. at 265; In re Gazelle, Inc., 17 Bankr. 617, 620 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1982). Cf. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 361.01 (15th ed. 1987) (adequate protec-
tion extends generally only to that portion of a creditor's claim that is secured).
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Moreover, setoff apparently remains available to satisfy creditors'
claims that would otherwise be subordinated,2" and as a procedural
matter, the right to setoff does not depend on the timely filing of a
proof of claim.2
Even outside the bankruptcy context, setoff remains an extraor-
dinarily fast and inexpensive means of debt collection. In addition,
its availability can provide a unique alternative to traditional
forms of security, as well as a means of reducing the judiciary's
ever-increasing backlog. Setoff is thus a valuable commercial
tool-a tool which should be standardized to avoid frustrating the
reasonable expectations of those who deal in the fast-paced, mod-
ern world of interstate commerce.
The Basic Problem
Despite the breadth of its application, or perhaps because of it,
the law of setoff is fraught with variations from jurisdiction to ju-
risdiction. Both the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code reference setoff rights expressly,2 9 yet neither defines nor
describes these rights. Both defer to applicable state law, which
varies widely in procedure, availability, and effect. Moreover, as
will be demonstrated, the treatment of setoff under these two
codes is inharmonious. Modern bankruptcy law effectively gives
setoff the status of a perfected security interest. As generally inter-
preted, the Uniform Commercial Code does not.
This jurisdictional variation and statutory discord forms the
main concern of this Article. Modern commercial transactions in-
creasingly cross state boundaries, yet still require speed in their
consummation and certainty in the availability, method, and ex-
tent of enforcement. Differences in state commercial law under-
27. In re Sound Emporium, Inc., 48 Bankr. 1, 2-3 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984); accord In re
De Feo Fruit Co., 24 Bankr. 220, 226 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982).
28. Setoff may be effected prior to discharge of the bankrupt even though no proof of
claim was filed before the court-ordered deadline. In re G.S. Omni Corp., 835 F.2d 1317
(10th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); In re Sutton Invs., Inc., 53 Bankr. 226, 230 (Bankr. W.D. La.
1985); see also In re Monex Corp., 43 Bankr. 879, 886 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (setoff alleged
in adversary proceeding sufficient as a proof of claim). But cf. In re Britton, 83 Bankr. 914,
920-21 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1988) (creditor waived setoff rights by filing proof of claim without
asserting such rights).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); U.C.C. §§ 4-303, 9-104(i), 9-306(4)(d) (1978).
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mine this certainty. General application of such legislation as the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform Partnership and Lim-
ited Partnership Acts3" leaves the law of setoff as one of the last
and most important sources of this troublesome variation.
PROCEDURAL DIFFERENCES AND INADEQUACIES
State Law
No state statute or provision of the Uniform Commercial Code
specifies what acts a creditor must take to exercise setoff rights. In
fact, the only aid the authors of the Uniform Commercial Code
provide is in the form of an almost humorous tautology: "In the
case of setoff the effective time is when the setoff is actually
made.""1
Judicial decisions have provided some help, requiring in most
states some overt or positive act to effect setoff.32 Yet, even this
rule is not universal. Pennsylvania apparently adheres to an old
common-law rule providing for the automatic extinction of ma-
tured mutual debts. 3 By operation of law and without any act by
either party, such debts are set off against each other as soon as
the latter of the two matures.
Even in jurisdictions that require some conduct to effect setoff
courts have not specified what conduct will suffice. Indeed, when
presented with a dispute as to whether certain actions constitute
setoff, courts have rarely used the opportunity to provide any gen-
eral guidelines.3 4 The one exception is the United States Court of
30. Other legislation contributing toward a single body of commercial law throughout the
Nation includes the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices
Act, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of
Title and Anti-theft Act, and federal laws, such as the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1982), and the corresponding regulations.
31. U.C.C. § 4-303 comment 5 (1978). In fairness to the drafters of the U.C.C., some
courts have found this comment useful. See cases cited infra notes 32-36.
32. E.g., United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101, 1106-07 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); Jefferson Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 684 F.
Supp. 1542 (D. Colo. 1988); In re McCormick, 5 Bankr. 726, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
33. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. United States, 657 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1981).
34. E.g., In re Elsinore Shore Assocs., 67 Bankr. 926, 945 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) ("Under
New Jersey case law, the charging or debiting of a debtor's funds on deposit by a creditor
1988]
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Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which established the following rule
in 1975: "setoff is not complete until three steps have been taken:
(1) the decision to exercise the right, (2) some action which accom-
plishes the setoff and (3) some record which evidences that the
right of setoff has been exercised. '3 5
Although several other courts have followed this rule,36 it pro-
vides little guidance. Step two is so vague that almost any conduct
might reasonably be considered sufficient. Step three apparently
requires an appropriate bookkeeping entry, but that too is uncer-
tain. Aside from rejecting the automatic extinction of mutual debts
present in Pennsylvania, this rule simply parallels the conclusory
statement found in the comment to the Uniform Commercial
Code.
This lack of clarity presents at least three problems. First, in the
abstract, if the procedures necessary to effect setoff are uncertain,
creditors may inadvertently waive their setoff rights.37 Alterna-
tively, creditors may simply refrain from exercising setoff for fear
of doing it incorrectly. For instance, a tenant who has lent money
to her landlord may not wish to attempt to set her rent obligation
off against the loan debt for fear of defaulting on her lease. Any
mortgagor, or other person whose contract requires periodic pay-
ments and includes nonpayment as a default from which accelera-
tion or foreclosure could result, might be similarly disinclined to
risk setoff unless the necessary procedures are clear.
bank has been recognized as constituting a setoff"); In re Saugus Gen. Hosp., 7 Bankr. 347,
352 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 698 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1983) (setoff effec-
tive when bank issued treasury checks to itself and depositor could no longer draw on funds
rather than when bookkeeping entry later made). In neither case did the court address what
lesser action, if any, will suffice.
35. Baker v. National City Bank, 511 F.2d 1016, 1018 (6th Cir. 1975).
36. See In re McCormick, 5 Bankr. 726, 730 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); United Seeds, Inc.
v. Eagle Green Corp., 223 Neb. 360, 363, 389 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1986).
37. Inoreality, waiver is based normally on the failure to timely claim setoff rights during
some judicial proceeding. See In re Metropolitan Int'l, Inc., 616 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1980) (also
holding that waiver must be intentional). Yet, a bank may also waive its setoff rights by
entering into a workout agreement with a depositor and the creditors of that depositor. In
re Applied Logic Corp., 576 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Dudley, 231 F.2d
396 (9th Cir. 1956); see also Walters v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 59 P.2d 983
(Cal. 1936), modified, 9 Cal. 2d 46, 69 P.2d 839 (1937) (setoff rights waived as against
garnishor). The likelihood of waiver in general or under the particular facts of these cases if
setoff were effected automatically when mutual debts matured, as in Pennsylvania, remains
in question.
[Vol. 30:51
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Second, creditors and courts must know the effective moment of
setoff to determine when interest on the extinguished debts stops
running and to calculate preference attacks under section 553(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code and fraudulent transfers under companion
section 548.38 Third, creditors must know what procedures consti-
tute setoff to determine what actions remain permissible once sub-
ject to the automatic bankruptcy stay. Lack of certainty on this
issue has been the source of much litigation.
Bankruptcy Stay Litigation
Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Codes9 prohibits generally all
action against the debtor and the bankruptcy estate when a bank-
ruptcy petition is filed. This prohibition expressly extends to the
exercise of setoff rights.4 ° Violations of the stay subject the offend-
ing party to liability for compensatory damages, attorneys' fees,
38. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 553 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see also id. § 547. These sections affect
the validity of prior transactions. They also measure time from the moment the bankruptcy
petition was filed to the instant the questioned transaction was performed. Courts and cred-
itors must therefore know precisely when the questioned transaction occurred to determine
its validity.
39. Id. § 362.
40. Id. § 362(a)(7). Section 362(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under sec-
tion 301, 302, or 303 of this title.... operates as a stay, applicable to all enti-
ties, of -
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
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and, in appropriate circumstances, punitive damages.4' Accord-
ingly, creditors must know what acts constitute setoff so that they
can protect themselves without violating the stay.42
The primary and most frequent question posed in this context is
whether a bank owed money by a bankrupt depositor may "freeze"
the assets remaining in the bankrupt's deposit account. Although
the issue is frequently raised, courts have not given it consistent
treatment.
Most courts analyzing this issue have determined that freezing a
debtor's account does not amount to a setoff and therefore does
not violate the stay.4" The grounds for such decisions have varied.
Some courts have looked to the three-step test established by the
Sixth Circuit and concluded that the necessary action or intent
was not present.44 Other courts have found support in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Some of these courts concluded that because the de-
posits are cash collateral that the trustee or debtor-in-possession
cannot use without a notice and a hearing,45 a freeze merely pre-
serves the status quo and effectuates the statutory scheme which
Congress created.46 Several other courts have relied on section
542(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires each entity owing a
matured debt to the bankruptcy estate to pay such debt to the
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
See id. § 362(b)(6)-(7) for exceptions relevant to setoff rights.
41. Id. § 362(h).
42. See Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 Bankr. 810, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (suggesting that an
administrative hold on bank deposits would violate § 362(a)(3) even if it did not constitute a
setoff stayed by § 362(a)(7)).
43. See cases cited infra notes 44, 46, 47; see also In re Raanes, 17 Bankr. 164, 166
(Bankr. D.S.D. 1982) ("The philosophy for staying a bank's right of setoff is to facilitate a
debtor's reorganization efforts. When a debtor is in a liquidation, there is no reason for
staying a post-filing setoff"); cf. In re Rinehart, 76 Bankr. 746, 755-56 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987)
(distinguished from an administrative freeze because a check was actually drawn on the
debtor's account).
44. In re Davis, 29 Bankr. 652, 654 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
46. In re Lee, 40 Bankr. 123, 125 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); In re Owens-Peterson, 39
Bankr. 186, 189 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984); In re Gazelle, Inc., 17 Bankr. 617, 620 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1982); Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank, 22 Bankr. 747, 749 (W.D.
Va. 1982); see also Rio v. Army Aviation Center Fed. Credit Union, 82 Bankr. 139 (M.D.
Ala. 1986) (discussing but not clearly basing its decision on § 363).
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trustee or debtor-in-possession "except to the extent that such
debt may be offset under section 553. ''4
Although a single, consistent rationale might be intellectually
pleasing, in resolving the issue, these courts have at least reached
for the most practical result. After all, "[i]f banks are unable to
follow such a procedure, they either must make frantic ex parte
applications to the bankruptcy courts for relief from the stay or sit
by and watch debtors dissipate funds subject to setoff rights recog-
nized in § 553. '48 In part for this reason, at least one early com-
mentator on the Bankruptcy Code expressly recommended freez-
ing deposit accounts subject to setoff rights.49
Nevertheless, several courts have held that retention of the
bankrupt's funds without prior court approval violates the stay."
Only one of these cases expressly considered section 542(b), which
appears to be determinative of the issue, 5 1 and most were based on
Pennsylvania law and its automatic setoff rule.52 Nevertheless,
47. In re Edgins, 36 Bankr. 480, 483 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984); In re Air Atlanta, Inc., 74
Bankr. 426, 427 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 81 Bankr. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1987); In re Williams, 61
Bankr. 567, 573-74 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986); In re Hoffman, 51 Bankr. 42, 46 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1985); In re Stann, 39 Bankr. 246, 248 (D. Kan. 1984); Kenney's Franchise Corp., 22
Bankr. at 748; In re Carpenter, 14 Bankr. 405, 407 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981); 11 U.S.C. §
542(b) (1982); see also cases cited supra note 15 (suggesting that deposit accounts merely
create a debt from the bank to the depositor).
48. In re Carpenter, 14 Bankr. at 407; see also In re Crispell, 73 Bankr. 375, 379-80
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987) (putting 7 day limit of freeze within which the bank must either
release the frozen funds to the trustee or petition the court for permission to exercise setoff).
49. Freeman, supra note 25, at 510 (at least with respect to liquidations and involuntarily
filed reorganizations); see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRuFrcY 553.15[6] (15th ed. 1987) ("freeze
should not be considered a violation of the stay"); Ahart, Bank Setoff Under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 205, 214 (1979) ("There is no rationale for
staying bank setoff in a chapter 7 liquidation case...").
50. United States v. Reynolds, 764 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Norton, 717
F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1983); In re Rinehart, 76 Bankr. 746 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987); In re Wildcat
Constr. Co., 57 Bankr. 981 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986); Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 Bankr. 810
(E.D. Pa. 1983); In re LHG Resources, Inc., 34 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983); In re
Executive Assocs., Inc., 24 Bankr. 171 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); In re Mealey, 16 Bankr. 800
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
51. In re Wildcat Constr. Co., 57 Bankr. at 985-86.
52. E.g., Norton, 717 F.2d at 772; In re Mealey, 16 Bankr. at 802 (citing a lower court
decision in Norton that also looked to Pennsylvania law). The bankruptcy court decision in
Cusanno, unlike the district court decision on appeal, was based expressly on Pennsylvania
law. In re Cusanno, 17 Bankr. 879, 882 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
The remaining cases generally followed this Pennsylvania-based precedent. United States
v. Reynolds, 764 F.2d at 1006-07 (following Norton); In re LHG Resources, Inc. 34 Bankr. at
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they all essentially concluded that a freeze on assets was itself an
effective exercise of setoff. This analysis was improper. Although
state law is properly considered in determining the availability of
setoff, nothing in section 553 or in the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code suggests that the propriety of freezing a debtor's
bank account should depend on differing state law classifications of
the same conduct. 53
Yet, the problems with state setoff procedures are not limited to
jurisdictional variations and the impact of such variations on what
are supposed to be uniform bankruptcy laws.54 The procedures are
also almost universally defective in another respect: they fail to re-
quire notice to the other party.
The Need for Notice
This Article favors the expansive use of setoff. Nevertheless, one
must recognize that setoff is an extremely powerful tool-a tool,
which even if exercised properly, may injure the other party. The
best example of this tendency is in a bank's use of setoff against a
depositor.
When a bank sets off funds in a depositor's checking account
against a debt owed it by that depositor, the bank is likely to dis-
honor any outstanding checks drawn on that account. If the debtor
is a merchant, such dishonor may cause suppliers to cease deliver-
ing goods necessary to the depositor's business or may cause utility
companies to discontinue essential services. 55 Requiring prior no-
203 (following In re Executive Assocs.); In re Executive Assocs., Inc., 24 Bankr. at 172 (fol-
lowing Cusanno). Recent authority, however, has held that Pennsylvania's automatic setoff
rule is inapplicable to setoffs in bankruptcy. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
53. Groschald, "Freezing" the Debtor's Bank Account: A Violation of the Automatic
Stay?, 57 Am. BANKR. L.J. 75, 81 (1983). See also In re Northwest Elec. Co., 81 Bankr. 392,
395 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) ("we think it clear that [the automatic setoff rule] was not
contemplated by the draftsmen of § 553, and that there must be an overt act by the creditor
prior to bankruptcy in order to invoke the provisions of § 553(b)").
54. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (providing that Congress shall have power to establish "uni-
form laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States").
55. E.g., Calmenson Clothing Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 63 S.D. 338, 258 N.W.
555 (1935) (payees of dishonored checks were wholesale merchants; evidence showed injury
to depositor's credit among these wholesalers); see also Fleischmann v. Mercantile Trust
Co., 617 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1981) (setoff and resulting dishonor allegedly caused damage to
relationship with creditors); Keller v. Commercial Credit Co., 149 Or. 372, 40 P.2d 1018
(1935) (failure to honor checks and other wrongful acts allegedly caused depositor to lose
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tice of setoff might eliminate these effects, but it would also drasti-
cally impair setoff rights. Not only would depositors rush to with-
draw their deposits after receiving notice, but setoff simply would
cease to be the swift remedy that it is today. Banks would no
longer be able to respond instantly to a bad situation. Lacking this
power, they may be less reticent to call in a depositor's loan,
thereby accelerating a different kind of injury to the depositor.
Requiring the bank to give contemporaneous notice of its action
to the depositor cannot eliminate injury. Yet, such notice might
reduce the amount of injury while costing the bank (or other party
effecting setoff) little or nothing in money, time, and effort. Pre-
sumably for this reason, at least one state has statutorily required
banks and savings and loan associations to notify depositors of set-
off within one day following its exercise.2 Moreover, article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code requires notice in an analogous
situation.
Upon default under a security agreement, the creditor is author-
ized to repossess the collateral. He may even do so without judicial
process if such can be done without breaching the peace. After
repossession, or merely after default if perfection was through pos-
session, as with an instrument or chattel paper,s the creditor may
sell the collateral by private or public sale. However, the creditor
must first give "reasonable notification of the time and place of
any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which
any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made."59
This notification requirement is designed so that the debtor and
any other "persons entitled to receive it will have sufficient time to
several business contracts); Harper v. First State Bank, 3 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)
(dishonor of checks resulting from setoff allegedly destroyed depositor's business);
Bernardini v. Central Nat'l Bank, 223 Va. 519, 290 S.E.2d 863 (1982) (setoff resulted in
dishonor of 27 checks).
56. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 864, 6660 (West Supp. 1988).
57. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978).
58. Id. §§ 9-304, 9-305.
59. Id. § 9-504(3). Notice is not required if the collateral "is perishable or threatens to
decline speedily in value." This concern is not present in setoff, however, because liquidated
debts are the only "collateral."
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take appropriate steps to protect their interests." 60 The debtor
cannot waive this notice prior to default."
Admittedly, the analogy is not a perfect one. In the context of
article 9, the protection accorded by notification usually consists of
the opportunity to monitor the intended sale. It thus enables the
debtor to reduce the risk of injury resulting from the creditor's
misconduct through, for example, a collusive or commercially un-
reasonable sale of the collateral.6 2 The benefit accorded by contem-
poraneous notice of setoff is more in the nature of protecting the
depositor from inadvertently injuring himself through the drawing
of additional checks likely to be dishonored."3 Yet this distinction
seems largely irrelevant. Contemporaneous notice of setoff requires
minimal effort, can produce no harm, and may actually serve a
useful purpose. Consequently, states have been delinquent in not
requiring such notice."
A requirement of contemporaneous notice has a concomitant
benefit. It provides a standard action necessary to effect setoff and
therefore provides a focus for analyzing preferences and fraudulent
transfers. If a transfer were potentially voidable, one need measure
only the time from the notice to the bankruptcy filing to determine
its validity. Indeed, because the notice itself can serve as the one
act necessary to effect setoff, it becomes setoff.65 A mere freeze on
a depositor's bank account will therefore not constitute setoff and
will not violate the stay.8
60. Id. § 9-504 comment 5.
61. Id. § 9-504(3).
62. Cf. id. § 9-507 (governing a secured creditor's liability for failing to give proper no-
tice). Notification also helps to effectuate U.C.C. § 9-506, giving debtors a right of redemp-
tion prior to sale.
63. Presumably because such inadvertent injury is less likely to result when obligors on
pledged accounts are instructed to direct their payments to the secured creditor, no notifica-
tion to the debtor of such instructions is required. See id. § 9-502.
64. Cf. Friendship Auto Sales, Inc. v. Bank of Willamette Valley, 300 Or. 522, 716 P.2d
715 (1986) (setoff treated as conversion for failure to give notice required under agreement).
65. Cf. Boyle v. American Sec. Bank, 531 A.2d 1258 (D.C. 1987) (contemporaneous notice
of setoff manifested election to accelerate note).
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (1982). As noted above, however, § 542(b) already seems to
resolve this problem.
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SUBSTANTIVE CONFUSION
Debt Status Needed for Setoff
No court or legislature has systematically laid down the elements
necessary for setoff rights to accrue or described the scope of the
setoff rights that have accrued. Even when one can glean general
rules from judicial decisions, such rules are neither followed uni-
versally nor based on any coherent policy. Nevertheless, some of
the basic requirements of setoff seem to command fairly wide-
spread agreement.
For example, most courts deny a person owed an unmatured
debt the unfettered ability to collect that debt through the exercise
of setoff.67 This seems reasonable. Such an ability would under-
mine the contractual relationship between the parties which ren-
dered the debt unmatured in the first place.
Courts generally recognize an exception to this rule if the person
against whom setoff is effected is insolvent.6 8 This exception also
makes sense. If setoff were not permitted in such circumstances,
the solvent party might never collect the debt owed him but would
still have to pay the debt he owes. This unfair result is precisely
what underlies the existence of setoff rights in bankruptcy.69
Contingent debts also have received fairly consistent treatment.
Courts generally prohibit setoff when the debt owed to the person
effecting it is contingent on some event which has not yet occurred
67. See Crocker-Citizens Nat'1 Bank v. Control Metals Corp., 566 F.2d 631, 637 (9th Cir.
1977); United States ex rel. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Tri-County Bank, 415 F. Supp. 858,
869-70 (D.S.D. 1976); Johnson v. Dutch Mill Dairy, Inc., 237 Minn. 117, 122, 54 N.W.2d 1, 4
(1952); Marine Midland Bank v. Graybar Elec. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 703, 708, 363 N.E.2d 1139,
1142-43, 395 N.Y.S.2d 403, 407 (1977); Zion's Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Rouse, 86 Utah 574,
578, 47 P.2d 617, 619 (1935); see also Clark, Bank Exercise of Setoff: Avoiding the Pitfalls,
98 BANKING L.J. 196, 206 (1981); Freeman, supra note 25, at 492. But see Bee Jay's Truck
Stop, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 86 Ill. App. 3d 7, 13, 407 N.E.2d 755, 760 (1980)
(garnishee could set off amount owing against a note not yet due); Comment, Bankruptcy:
Mutuality as a Requirement for Set-off, 28 CALIF. L. REV. 606, 609 & n.17 (1940).
68. E.g., Glenn Justice Mortgage Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d 567, 572 n.5 (10th Cir.
1979); Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1975); cf. Walter v. National City Bank,
42 Ohio St. 2d 524, 527-28, 330 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1975) (insolvency exception inapplicable if
insolvency preceded creation of the debt to be set off). Even without this exception, insol-
vency often constitutes contractual grounds for accelerating a debt to maturity. See Clark,
supra note 67, at 207.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
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or on some action which has not yet been performed. 70 Although
these courts have failed to express the reason for this rule, the ra-
tionale seems to be the same as that for requiring a debt to be
matured: if available, unilateral exercise of setoff would enable the
obligee to bypass the contractual obligation that renders the debt
to him not yet due.
Courts have not yet determined whether insolvency also operates
as an exception to this rule, rendering contingent debts available
for setoff. Yet, unlike unmatured debts, contingent debts do not
necessarily become due in time. The mere fact of insolvency, there-
fore, would seem insufficient to warrant accrual of setoff rights.7'
Moreover, a contingent debt might have a true value unrelated to
the face amount of the obligation and highly dependent on the
likelihood of the contingency. 72 Even if setoff were permitted, it
might be appropriate or even necessary to reduce the amount of
the contingent debt which could be applied in offset, discharging
the remainder. 3
General agreement also exists on another requirement. The debt
owed to the person effecting setoff must be a liquidated one.74
Again, courts have not explained the reason for this rule, but that
reason is not difficult to deduce. If a debt remains unliquidated, a
claim based on a tortious injury, for example, the debtor
70. Walker v. Carolina Mills Lumber Co., 429 So. 2d 1065, 1069-70 (Ala. App. 1983) (set-
off denied when contingency existed, proper once debt became fixed); Johnson v. Dutch Mill
Dairy, Inc., 237 Minn. at 122, 54 N.W.2d at 4.
71. Cf. Comment, supra note 67, at 610 (suggesting that if the contingency is that the
debtor is only secondarily liable, and the creditor is required first to exercise his rights and
exhaust his remedies against the primary obligor(s), insolvency of the primary obligor(s)
should empower the creditor to exercise setoff against the debtor).
72. An unmatured debt's value is unlikely to be affected significantly by the lack of ma-
turity itself, provided adequate interest is charged. Of course, as with the value of any debt,
the value of an unmatured debt may depend significantly on the financial status of the
obligor.
73. Once a bankruptcy petition has been filed, a contingent debt owed by the bankrupt
can form the basis for an allowable claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1982) (defining "claim").
The bankruptcy court must estimate the value of the claim, essentially removing the contin-
gency and fixing the debt owed by the bankrupt. Id. § 502(c). Under this process, setoff
rights would accrue and could be invoked properly.
74. Kress v. Central Trust Co., 153 Misc. 397, 398, 275 N.Y.S. 14, 16 (1934); Freeman,
supra note 25, at 492; TeSelle, Banker's Right of Setoff - Banker Beware, 34 OKLA. L. REv.
41, 50-51 (1981); cf. Comment, supra note 67, at 609 & n.18 (suggesting unliquidated debts
may be set off).
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(tortfeasor) normally may not unilaterally determine the proper
debt owed by the creditor (victim). A different rule does not and
should not apply merely because the creditor happens to owe the
debtor on some other obligation, however related. Accordingly, set-
off of an unliquidated debt would be inappropriate if binding on
the other party.
If setoff were not binding, then it would serve little or no pur-
pose. If the parties cannot agree on a settlement and thereby liqui-
date the debt themselves, a judicial determination will be neces-
sary. Nonbinding setoff would not remove the need for that
determination. At best, it would provide a delay before recourse to
the courts became necessary. In return, it would increase the issues
requiring judicial scrutiny and time. These problems are precisely
what setoff is designed to reduce. Hence, setoff is restricted gener-
ally to liquidated debts. 5
The last debt attribute necessary for setoff rights to accrue is
mutuality. Mutuality is universally required, but it is rarely under-
stood and often improperly applied. It is a source of interminable
confusion, faulty analysis, and unjust results. Perhaps most impor-
tant, the mishandling of mutuality has frustrated commercial ex-
pectations, not merely in those disputes battled out in court, but in
those that were not litigated because of the existence of bad
precedent.
In spite of this history, mutuality is not difficult to understand.
For debts to be mutual, they must be between the same parties,
and must be owing to and due in the same capacities. 6 In other
words, for setoff to be proper, the party to whom each debt is owed
must be the party on whom the other debt obligation falls. More-
over, each party must be acting in the same legal capacity on both
debts. If John, in his individual capacity, owes a debt to Mary, and
75. As with contingent claims, a bankruptcy court can liquidate an unliquidated claim
through the estimation process. See supra note 73.
76. In re Flughun Constr. Corp., 23 Bankr. 147, 152 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); see also
Mercantile Trust Co. v. Mosby, 623 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) ("to warrant a setoff,
the demands must be mutual and subsisting between the same parties and must be due in
the same capacity or right") (quoting Dalton v. Sturdivant Bank, 230 Mo. App. 800, 76
S.W.2d 425 (1934)); Nichols v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St. 542, 545, 31 N.E.2d
224, 225 (1941) ("mutuality of parties is an essential condition of a valid set-off .... That is,
the debts must be to and from the same persons and in the same capacity").
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John, as trustee for someone else, is owed a debt from Mary, mutu-
ality is lacking. If Mary were permitted to set the two debts off,
the trust would-have lost an asset without having one of its liabili-
ties discharged. If Jol--iiwre to set the debts off, the trust would
be similarly drained (although it might have a claim against John
for breach of his fiduciary obligations).
This simple and obvious principle first encounters difficulty
when more than one obligee or obligor exists on one of the two
debts. Prior to the time when state law was found to control in
federal diversity actions, Gray v. RolloJ 7 7 laid the rule down for fed-
eral courts. Pursuant to this decision, a debt owed by joint obligors
could be set off against a debt owing to one of them, but a debt
owing to joint obligees could not be set off against a debt owed by
only one of them. The apparent rationale for this distinction rested
in the potential prejudice to the co-obligee who is not party to the
setoff. Setting off the debt of two joint obligors against a debt owed
to one of them could not possibly prejudice the rights of the co-
obligor. At worst, setoff might require the obligor who was party to
the setoff to claim rights of contribution against his co-obligor.7 1
On the other hand, using a debt owed to joint obligees to set off a
debt owed by one of them gives that obligee a disproportionate
benefit of the jointly owned debt account, unfairly prejudicing the
co-obligee.
This reasoning makes good sense as far as it goes. Yet the dis-
tinction is subject to question when analyzed through its most
common example: bank use of funds in a joint account to set off a
debt owed to the bank by one of the joint accountholders. In such
a case, each depositor has the power to collect the debt owed to
them jointly. The depositor whose debt is discharged or reduced
through setoff simply could have withdrawn funds from the ac-
count and used them to satisfy or reduce his debt.79 The co-owner
of the account would still lose account funds, but would have no
77. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 629 (1873).
78. This result does imply that the debt was jointly and severally owed. Otherwise, no
single obligor could be required, either directly or through setoff, to pay more than his pro-
portionate share. See Comment, supra note 67, at 612-13.
79. Largely for this reason, the Supreme Court ruled that the IRS may levy on a joint
bank account even though only one of the joint depositors owes a tax deficiency. United
States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713 (1985). For the due process implications
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cause to attack the transfer. Characterizing the same transfer as
improper merely because it is effected by the bank seems strange.
On the other hand, subjecting joint depositors to the conse-
quences of each other's actions after they have consented to share
the same account seems more appropriate than subjecting them to
the whim of a third party, such as a bank. Moreover, outside of the
context of joint bank accounts, the distinction between setoff rules
for co-obligors and co-obligees is based on good policy, and some-
thing is gained by having a clear, concise rule.
Unfortunately, state courts have neither accepted this distinc-
tion nor thoroughly analyzed the issue. Instead, they have adopted
a variety of different and contradictory rules. Some courts entirely
disallow setoff of joint account deposits to satisfy an individual
debt unless the deposit contract expressly provides otherwise.8 0
Others permit it only to the extent deposits by the debtor can be
traced into the account."' Still others permit it entirely.8 2
State courts have also departed from each other with regard to
jointly owed debts. Some permit setoff;s3 others do not.84 If these
jurisdictional differences were the only problems created by the
mutuality requirement, the issue here might properly be relegated
to a single footnote. In trying to do equity with special bank depos-
its, however, courts have confounded matters to a much greater
degree.
Exactly what constitutes a special deposit is unclear. Perhaps
such deposits can be described best by their principal effect: gen-
eral deposits may be used to set off a debt owed by the bank's
depositor, while special deposits are immune from this action. Of
of this rule, see Note, Levying on Joint Bank Accounts: A Ticking Bomb for the Nondelin-
quent Joint Account Holder, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1308 (1986).
80. Cf. Chickerneo v. Society Natl Bank, 58 Ohio St. 2d 315, 390 N.E.2d 1183 (1979);
Nichols v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 Ohio St. 542, 31 N.E.2d 224 (1941).
81. In re Davis, 29 Bankr. 652, 654 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Peoples Bank v. Turner, 169 Md.
430, 182 A. 314 (1936); Fleming v. Bank of Va., 231 Va. 299, 343 S.E.2d 341 (1986).
82. Burgess v. First Nat'l Bank, 31 Colo. App. 67, 497 P.2d 1035 (1972).
83. Rush v. Citizens' Natl Bank, 114 Ark. 170, 169 S.W. 777 (1914); Sears v. Continental
Bank & Trust Co., 553 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 562 S.W.2d 843
(Tex. 1977); see also TeSelle, supra note 74, at 52-53.
84. Teeters v. City Nat'l Bank, 214 Ind. 498, 14 N.E.2d 1004 (1938); Harrison v. Harrison,
118 Ind. 179, 20 N.E. 746 (1889); Moore v. Greenville Banking & Trust Co., 173 N.C. 180, 91
S.E. 793 (1917).
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course, merely describing deposits in this manner does not help
differentiate between those that are available for setoff and those
that are not.
The basic nature of special deposits is that they belong to some-
one else; their equitable ownership is held by someone other than
the depositor. Because the depositor is not the true owner, mutual-
ity is lacking and setoff would be improper. Putting it another way,
some courts have noted that special deposits are less like a debt
and more like a trust or bailment. The normal debtor/creditor rela-
tionship between a bank and its depositor 5 does not arise and the
bank acquires no title to the funds. The beneficial owner retains
title.86
This analysis is technically wrong. Title to the funds does and
should pass to the bank.87 Ownership of the bank's concomitant
debt on the account, however, does not belong to the depositor. It
85. See supra note 15.
86. First City Nat'l Bank v. Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 363 So. 2d 770, 772 (Ala. 1978);
Coyle v. Pan Am. Bank, 377 So. 2d 213, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Bernardini v. Central
Nat'l Bank, 223 Va. 519, 521, 290 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1982).
87. If a bank became insolvent and insufficient assets and insurance existed to fully reim-
burse all depositors, neither the titular owner nor the beneficial owner of the account would
have any special claim on any remaining bank assets. Unless they have setoff rights against
the insolvent bank, see Comment, supra note 23, the titular and beneficial owners would
have to share proportionally with all other depositors who became creditors of the bank. But
cf. Hopper v. New Jersey Title Guar. & Trust Co., 127 N.J. Eq. 1, 11 A.2d 60 (1940) (ruling
that special deposits are recoverable from the remaining funds of an insolvent bank before
general depositors get their pro rata share, but ultimately resting decision on the true trust
established by delivery of collateral to bank with instructions to sell it and hold the pro-
ceeds); see also Tompkins v. Bender, 42 F. Supp. 211 (M.D. Pa. 1941) (beneficial owners of
property or funds held in trust by an insolvent bank are entitled to recover such assets in
full); Borough of Deal v. Asbury Park & Ocean Grove Bank, 118 N.J. Eq. 297, 178 A. 790
(1935) (deposits in Borough's "Coupon Account" intended to satisfy bond interest obliga-
tions were special deposits; Borough had claim to remaining assets of insolvent bank over
general depositors).
On the other hand, if a bank agrees to function as trustee under an express written trust,
no debtor/creditor relationship need be created. For example, the bank might merely invest
the trust res in stocks or bonds, in which case the bank will never have functioned in a
capacity as either a debtor or creditor of the trust, and the trust beneficiaries would have
priority in such stocks or bonds over creditors of the bank. Once a deposit account is estab-
lished, however, a debtor/creditor relationship necessarily follows. The bank must become a
debtor of the depositor. If the bank in its capacity as trustee opened the deposit account,
the bank as trustee becomes a creditor of the bank in its capacity as a bank. Cf. Kaufman v.
First Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 1070, 1072 (5th Cir. 1974) ("if a trustee deposits trust funds in
his name as such, the deposit is general and a debtor-creditor relationship is created").
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is beneficially owned by someone else. Yet, this analytical error
does not appear too significant, as setoff is improper under both
modes of analysis. The real problem arises because courts have not
limited special deposits to those arising out of trusts.
Courts themselves are the first to admit that their decisions in
this area of law reveal "some fuzziness and overlap in the analy-
sis." Some courts look to the law of trusts; others merely ask
whether the deposit was created with a special purpose known to
both the bank and the depositor; still others use these rules inter-
changeably."8 From such confusion two main lines of authority
have emerged. Under the majority or "legal" rule, a bank may ef-
fect setoff against a depositor, even though a third party has an
interest in the depositor's account, provided the bank has no
knowledge of such interest or of sufficient facts to put it on inquiry
notice. Under the "equitable" rule, a bank may not effect setoff
against account funds in which a third party has an interest, re-
gardless of the bank's lack of knowledge, unless the bank detri-
mentally relied on the depositor's apparent sole ownership of the
account.89
Unfortunately, what constitutes an "interest" sufficient to in-
voke either rule remains unclear. Moreover, both rules miss the
mark and go far beyond what should be their intended target. The
United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals assessed the situa-
tion accurately:
It is indeed settled law that a bank cannot exercise a setoff
against a deposit which is known by it to be dedicated to a spe-
cial use, e.g., for the sole purpose of meeting payrolls or paying
taxes .... If in fact such deposits were 'made in trust,' as some
courts have said, or constituted contracts between the depositor
and the bank for the benefit of a third party who could enforce
it against the bank, the cases could be explained on the simple
88. In re Multiponics, Inc., 622 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Kaufman v. First
Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d at 1071-72.
89. In re Triple A Coal Co., 55 Bankr. 806, 812 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (quoting TeSelle,
supra note 74, at 71-72). See also Emile v. Bright, 203 So. 2d 328, 329 (Fla. App. 1967),
aff'd, 216 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 1968); National Indemnity Co. v. Spring Branch State Bank, 162
Tex. 521, 524, 348 S.W.2d 528, 529 (1961); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwaukee W.
Bank, 61 Wis. 2d 671, 680-81, 214 N.W.2d 33, 37-38 (1974); Comment, Bank's Right of Set-
off - Iola State Bank v. Bolan, 33 KAN. L. REv. 569, 573-74 (1985).
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ground that the situation was not one of 'mutual debts or cred-
its,' to which alone [the old Bankruptcy Act] applies. However,
the principle seems to go beyond such cases and to include
others.9
The variety of situations that are included under this special
purpose principle is staggering.91 Yet, at least to some extent, the
principle is used unnecessarily. Proper trust analysis does not re-
quire that the trust be written, express, or even necessarily made
known to the bank.92 This principle is demonstrated aptly by the
facts of South Central Livestock Dealers, Inc. v. Security State
Bank. 3
There, the depositor was in the business of feeding and other-
wise caring for investors' cattle. The depositor would sell the fat-
tened cattle, deduct fees and other related expenses from the pro-
ceeds, and then deposit the balance in its bank account. Clearly
then, the depositor was acting as the investors' agent, and never
had any true claim to all the proceeds. Accordingly, the court could
have appropriately imposed an implied or constructive trust on the
deposited proceeds. This action would have destroyed mutuality
and prevented the bank from using the deposits to set off the debt
owed it by the depositor.94
Unfortunately, the court did not analyze the issue on trust prin-
ciples or proceed in this manner. Instead of focusing on whether a
third party had sufficient ownership rights in the deposited funds
to restrict the accountholder's use of such funds, the court dis-
cussed simply whether the bank knew that the deposited funds
90. In re Applied Logic Corp., 576 F.2d 952, 958 (2d Cir. 1978).
91. E.g., First City Nat'l Bank v. Long-Lewis Hardware Co., 363 So. 2d 770 (Ala. 1978)
(deposits intended for automobile purchase were special and not available for setoff; equita-
ble estoppel against the bank, although not argued, may otherwise support the result).
92. If the bank extends credit to the depositor in reliance on what it thinks are general
deposits, the lack of mutuality should not necessarily destroy setoff rights. See supra note
89 and accompanying text.
93. 614 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1980).
94. See also Rodi Boat v. Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co., 236 F. Supp. 935
(E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 339 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1964) (debtor's unauthorized sale of collateral consti-
tuted grounds for a constructive trust on the deposited proceeds).
In a situation warranting an implied or constructive trust, if the bank has no notice of the
structure of its depositor's business and accounting practices, setoff still would be improper
but damages should be limited to return of the funds improperly set off.
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"belonged" to some third party.95 Such sloppy analysis leads to ab-
surd and conflicting results." More importantly, such analysis gen-
erates additional judicial confusion, leading to the use of these
vague mutuality principles to resolve what are, and should be
treated, as priority disputes.9"
Conflicting Resolutions of Priority
Priority disputes arise when a third party claims rights in one of
the debts that setoff has or is about to reduce or extinguish. Ad-
mittedly, this fact alone makes priority very similar to mutuality,
which also concerns the rights of third parties. Indeed, perhaps any
functional difference is largely illusory. Yet, priority conflicts, as
discussed in this Article, involve rights acquired in a definite man-
ner and through a specific legislative scheme: for example, through
95. 614 F.2d at 1059-60.
96. For an absurd result, see Iola State Bank v. Bolan, 235 Kan. 175, 679 P.2d 720 (1984)
(bank not permitted to set off debtor's account and held liable for conversion for not honor-
ing checks because funds in account were found to "belong" to the debtor's suppliers, who
were the payees). The issue presented in this case is more properly analyzed in the cases
cited infra note 100.
For conflicting results, compare In re Goodson Steel Corp., 488 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1974),
and Ribaudo v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 261 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1958) (both holding that mere
designation of account as "Payroll Account" insufficient to render deposit special), with In
re Saugus Gen. Hosp., 7 Bankr. 347 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1980) (payroll account deposits were
special and unavailable for setoff). The latter holding was affirmed on appeal. In re Saugus
Gen. Hosp., 698 F.2d 42, 46-47 (1st Cir. 1983) (expressly noting that special deposits were
not limited by a "trust fund" theory).
Additional conflicting results are generated by the "special purpose" test itself, because
jurisdictions are divided on whether to use the "legal" or "equitable" rule. See supra notes
88-89 and accompanying text.
97. Numerous decisions have improperly invoked the concept of mutuality to analyze
what were essentially priority disputes. See National Acceptance Co. v. Virginia Capital
Bank, 498 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 673 F.2d 1314 (4th
Cir. 1981) (unpublished opinion) (setoff against secured creditor); Iola State Bank v. Bolan,
235 Kan. 175, 679 P.2d 720 (1984) (setoff against payee of a check); Cooper v. Nevada Bank
of Commerce, 81 Nev. 344, 403 P.2d 198 (1965); Morrison Steel Co. v. Gurtman, 113 N.J.
Super. 474, 274 A.2d 306 (1971) (setoff against secured creditor); (setoff against landlord
lienor); Middle Atlantic Credit Corp. v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 199 Pa. Super. 456,
185 A.2d 818 (1962) (setoff against secured creditor); Commercial Discount Corp. v. Milwau-
kee W. Bank, 61 Wis. 2d 671, 214 N.W.2d 33 (1974) (setoff against secured creditor); see
also Note, Conflicts Between a Bank's Common Law Right of Setoff and a Secured Party's
Interest in Identifiable Proceeds, 9 Loy. U. CHL L.J. 454, 473 (1978) ("the courts have not
treated setoff against [a] third party [with a security interest in] funds as a priority
problem").
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article 3, 4, or 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.98 A determina-
tion of whether such rights prime the setoff rights of an obligor
must be made pursuant to the express provisions of that legislative
scheme. If the statute or code is silent, the determination should
be made with reference to the legislation's policies and purpose. If
such policies and purpose are not undermined by the recognition
and priority of setoff, then a setoff should be permitted.
In other words, priority concerns third-party rights acquired by
statute; mutuality concerns other third-party rights. Use of mutu-
ality concepts to protect statutory rights is inappropriate. If legis-
lation creating commercial rights to a debt in a third party is not
undermined by the use of setoff, then a common-law doctrine
aimed at protecting such parties is, at minimum, superfluous. More
likely, it becomes a legal eddy disrupting the free-flowing stream of
commerce.
The priority disputes litigated most frequently can be segregated
into the following five distinct groups, each governed by a different
statute or article of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Party Claiming Priority In Governing
Debt Subject to Setoff Statute
1. Taxing Authority (via a notice of levy) Tax Code
2. Check Payee (v. drawee bank) Article 4
3. Garnishor Garnishment Statute
4. Instrument Assignee Article 3
5. Secured Creditor (v. obligor on collateral) Article 9
The first of these conflicts pits creditors' setoff rights against the
rights of a taxing authority that has levied on a debt owed to a
delinquent taxpayer. In such instances, tax statutes and policies
control the outcome, giving the issue little relevance to general
commercial transactions." The second conflict involves the right of
98. Articles 5, 7, and 8, garnishment statutes, and tax levy authorizations might also cre-
ate rights involved in priority disputes.
99. See Peoples Nat'l Bank v. United States, 777 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985); Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. United States, 345 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965); Bank of Nevada v.
United States, 251 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958); United States
v. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 360 F. Supp. 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd in part and
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a bank to effect setoff against a depositor after one or more checks
drawn by the depositor have been presented for payment. In con-
struing article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, courts have al-
most universally held that setoff may be effected any time before
the draft has been finally paid, that is, by midnight on the next
banking day after the item was presented.100 Again, however, the
issue has little relevance to the resolution of other priority dis-
putes. The remaining three disputes are somewhat interrelated
and, in the case of the last, lead to many diverse and improper
results.
As with the second priority dispute, courts have almost uni-
formly held that the setoff rights of a garnishee defeat the rights of
the garnishor.101 In one respect this uniformity is somewhat sur-
rev'd in part, 494 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1974) (all holding that setoff rights cannot defeat the
rights of the IRS); cf. Almi, Inc. v. Dick Corp., 31 Pa. Commw. 26, 375 A.2d 1343 (1977)
(taxing authorities lost to Pennsylvania automatic setoff).
100. E.g., Hudgins v. Florida Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 399 So. 2d 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Conn v. Bank of Clarendon Hills, 53 Ill. 2d 33, 289 N.E.2d 425 (1972); Citizens Nat'l
Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 177 Ind. App. 548, 380 N.E.2d 1243 (1978); Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Stauffer Seeds, Inc. v.
Nebraska Sec. Bank, 222 Neb. 594, 386 N.W.2d 2 (1986); Pracht v. Oklahoma State Bank,
592 P.2d 976 (Okla. 1979); Community Bank v. United States Nat'l Bank, 276 Or. 471, 555
P.2d 435 (1976); West Side Bank v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d
587 (1968). But see H. Schultz & Sons, Inc. v. Bank of Suffolk County, 439 F. Supp. 1137
(E.D.N.Y 1977); Iola State Bank v. Bolan, 235 Kan. 175, 679 P.2d 720 (1984) (payee had
security interest in funds and bank acted in bad faith); Note, Bank Procedures and the
U.C.C.-When is a Check Finally Paid?, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COMM. L. REv. 957 (1968) (criticizing
West Side Bank).
Recent cases on a bank's right to charge back provisional settlements of credit card re-
ceivables have invoked similar article 4 principles in finding that such setoff rights warrant
relief from the automatic bankruptcy stay. In re Twenty-Four Hour Nautilus Swim & Fit-
ness Center, Inc., 81 Bankr. 71 (D. Colo. 1987); In re United Sciences of Am., Inc., 84 Bankr.
79 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
101. E.g., Valley Nat'l Bank v. Hasper, 6 Ariz. App. 376, 432 P.2d 924 (1967); Walters v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 59 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1936), modified, 9 Cal. 2d 46, 69
P.2d 839 (1937); Coyle v. Pan Am. Bank, 377 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); First
Nat'l Bank v. Sinkler, 170 Ga. App. 668, 317 S.E.2d 897 (1984); Bee Jay's Truck Stop, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 86 Ill. App. 3d 7, 407 N.E.2d 755 (1980); Hoffman Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Washington County Nat'l Say. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 467 A.2d 758 (1983); Blow v. Blow, 134
Mich. App. 408, 350 N.W.2d 890 (1984); Herd v. Ingle, 713 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
Board of Trustees v. Durable Developers, Inc., 102 Nev. 401, 724 P.2d 736 (1986); Industrial
Comm'r v. Five Corners Tavern, Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 639, 393 N.E.2d 1005 (1979); In re Taxes of
Bob Dance Chevrolet, 67 N.C. App. 509, 313 S.E.2d 207 (1984); Almi, Inc. v. Dick Corp., 31
Pa. Commw. 26, 375 A.2d 1343 (1977); cf. Gambino v. Culp, 485 So. 2d 512 (La. Ct. App.
1986) (setoff denied because judgment lien preceded creation of debt to be set off).
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prising. After all, the rights of a garnishor are controlled by statute
in most states, and those statutes are not part of any uniform code.
Yet, the basic concept of garnishment would support no other re-
sult. A garnishor steps into the shoes of the defendant and is sub-
ject to any defense the garnishee may have against the defend-
ant.102 In essence, the garnishment is a sort of assignment in which
the assignee cannot acquire rights greater than those possessed by
the assignor. l03
This rationale and analysis play heavily in the resolution of the
fourth dispute, whether setoff rights are primed by the rights of
someone who was assigned one of the debts to be set off. If the
assigned debt be in the form of a negotiable instrument'0 4 and if
the assignee qualifies as a holder in due course,0 5 the assignee
clearly does and should take free of any setoff rights of the obligor
on the instrument.106 This rule underlies all of article 3 and is nec-
essary to preserve the free transferability of negotiable instru-
ments. The more interesting question arises when the instrument
is not negotiable or the assignee otherwise fails to qualify as a
holder in due course.
102. Coyle, 377 So. 2d at 216; Sinkler, 170 Ga. App. at 671, 317 S.E.2d at 900; Hoffman
Chevrolet, 297 Md. at 712, 467 A.2d at 769; Durable Developers, Inc., 102 Nev. at 410, 724
P.2d at 743; Herd v. Ingle, 713 S.W.2d at 888.
103. Almi, Inc. v. Dick Corp., 31 Pa. Commw. at 34-35, 375 A.2d at 1348.
104. The requirements of negotiability are set forth in U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (1978), which
provides:
Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money
and no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker or drawer
except as authorized by this Article; and
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(d) be payable to order or to bearer.
105. See id. § 3-302 (defining holder in due course generally to mean someone who takes a
negotiable instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice that it is overdue, has
been dishonored, or is subject to any claim or defense).
106. One who qualifies as a holder in due course takes free of almost all defenses, and
therefore would not take subject to the setoff rights of the instrument's maker. See id. § 3-
305. This rule is perhaps the very heart of article 3, which seeks to protect the stream of
commerce by providing for the unfettered flow of commercial paper.
The only relevant exception occurs where a holder acquires the instrument knowing that
setoff had been previously effected, thereby discharging all or part of the instrument. See id.
§ 3-305(2)(e).
THE PROBLEMS WITH SETOFF
As is often the case, a banking situation provides the most com-
mon example of the problem: assignment of a debt in the form of a
bank's certificate of deposit. Most certificates of deposit ("CD"s)
issued by banks are not payable to the order of the purchaser nor
to the bearer of the certificate. Accordingly, they lack the require-
ments of negotiability107 and cannot create a holder in due
course.
1 0 8
If an assignee does not acquire the rights of a holder in due
course, basic law and common sense mandate that the assignee re-
ceive by way of the assignment no greater rights than those pos-
sessed by the assignor. Simply put, the assignor cannot assign what
he or she does not have. Fortunately, the Uniform Commercial
Code does incorporate this obvious principle. A transferee of an
instrument receives only those rights of the transferor. 1 9 A holder
not qualifying as a holder in due course takes an instrument sub-
ject to all valid claims and all defenses. 110 Accordingly, the assignee
of a nonnegotiable CD must take subject to the issuing bank's set-
off rights against the CD's original purchaser."1
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which governs both
security arrangements and transfers of accounts and chattel pa-
per, 2 treats the assignees of such debt obligations similarly. Pur-
suant to section 9-318, such assignees take subject to all of the
terms of the contract between the account debtor and the assignor
and any other defenses or claims of the account debtor arising
before the assignment." 3 The official comment makes clear that
107. See id. § 3-104(1)(d), (3).
108. See id. §§ 3-302(1), 3-102(1)(e).
109. Id. § 3-201(1).
110. Id. § 3-306(a)-(b), quoted infra note 125.
111. FDIC v. Pioneer State Bank, 155 N.J. Super. 381, 382 A.2d 958 (1977); see also Con-
tinental Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Alamo, 578 S.W.2d 625 (Tenn. 1979) (suggesting
that the setoff rights of a CD issuer defeat the assignee's rights, but not reaching the issue
because mutuality was lacking).
112. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1978).
113. Id. § 9-318(1). This provision reads as follows:
Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to assert
defenses or claims arising out of a sale as provided in Section 9-206 the rights
of an assignee are subject to
(a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and assignor and
any defense or claim arising therefrom; and
1988]
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such defenses or claims include setoffs. n4
Presumably, then, the same result should obtain when the as-
signment is not outright, but merely one for security. In such a
case, the assignee does not even receive all of the assignor's rights;
he merely receives the rights of the assignor to the extent of the
assignor's indebtedness." 5 In fact, one court has followed this line
of reasoning with respect to a CD pledged as security."n  However,
proper analysis requires that security arrangements be evaluated
through both the intricacies of article 9 and the basic rule of sec-
tion 9-201, which makes a perfected security interest effective
against all other creditors."' Indeed, article 3 is expressly made
subject to the provisions of article 9.18 In this context, disputes
between secured creditors and parties seeking to effect setoff in a
debt pledged to such a creditor, judicial confusion concerning set-
off reaches its apex.
In Citizens National Bank v. Bornstein,"9 the Supreme Court of
Florida attempted a comprehensive analysis of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code's treatment of the conflicting rights of a bank issuing
a CD and a creditor secured in that CD. The court suggested that
section 9-318(1) setoff defenses would protect the issuing bank
from the secured creditor, but only if the bank qualified as an ac-
count debtor.120 The court then proceeded to examine the Code's
definitional provisions.
(b) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor which
accrues before the account debtor receives notification of the assignment.
114. Id. § 9-318 comment 1; see also James Talcott, Inc. v. H. Corenzwit & Co., 76 N.J.
305, 387 A.2d 350 (1978).
115. Kaw Valley State Bank & Trust v. Commercial Bank, 567 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978); see also U.C.C. § 3-201(2) (1978).
116. Kaw Valley State Bank & Trust v. Commercial Bank, 567 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978); see also Bank of Crystal Springs v. First Nat'l Bank, 427 So. 2d 968 (Miss. 1983)
(setoff rights of a bank issuing a CD primed rights of creditor secured in that CD - decision
based on non-code law because setoff priority disputes held outside the scope of article 9).
117. Except as otherwise provided expressly in article 9, "a security agreement is effective
according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against
creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201 (1978).
118. Id. § 3-103(2).
119. 374 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1979).
120. Id. at 13. Section 9-318 facially applies only to assignment transfers, not security
interests. Nevertheless, the court was apparently willing, and properly so, to award the sec-
tion's protection to any account debtor whose obligation was pledged by the account credi-
tor as security for a loan. Cf. Business Fin. Services, Inc. v. AGN Dev. Corp., 143 Ariz. 603,
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Account debtor is defined as a "person who is obligated on an
account, chattel paper or general intangible."'' An examination of
the definitions of these terms quickly reveals that a CD is neither
an account nor chattel paper. 122 Moreover, the definition of a gen-
eral intangible expressly excludes any property constituting an in-
strument.12 3 A CD qualifies as an instrument.1 24 Thus, a CD is not
a general intangible. Accordingly, the issuing bank was not an ac-
count debtor and was not entitled to the benefits of section 9-
318(1).
Counsel for the bank next argued that, even if the bank were not
entitled to the protections of section 9-318, the secured creditor's
rights still were subject to the bank's setoff rights. For support,
counsel pointed to section 3-306, which governs the rights of a
holder of an instrument who does not qualify as a holder in due
course. 25 Although section 3-306 facially applies only to negotiable
694 P.2d 1217 (Ariz. App. 1984) (account debtor's setoff rights defeated rights of creditor
secured in that account).
121. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(a) (1978).
122. An account is a "right to payment for goods sold or services rendered." Id. § 9-106.
The bank purchased no goods or services. Chattel paper is "a writing or writings which
evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest." Id. § 9-105(1)(b). The bank
gave no security for its obligation on the CD.
123. A general intangible is "any personal property.., other than goods, accounts, chat-
tel paper, documents, instruments, and money." Id. § 9-106.
124. An instrument can be a negotiable instrument, a certificated security, "or any other
writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and . . . is of a type which is in
ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or as-
signment." Id. § 9-105(1)(i). A nonnegotiable CD fully satisfies this definition. Smith v.
Mark Twain Nat'l Bank, 805 F.2d 278, 285-86 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Dawson, 52 Bankr. 444,
447 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984); General Elec. Co. v. M & C Mfg., Inc., 283 Ark. 110, 111-12,
671 S.W.2d 189, 190 (1984); Republican Valley Bank v. Security State Bank, 229 Neb. 339,
343, 426 N.W.2d 529, 532 (1988); Old S. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of North Carolina, 36 N.C.
App. 18, 27, 244 S.E.2d 264, 269 (1978); First Nat'l Bank v. Lone Star Life Ins. Co., 524
S.W.2d 525, 529-30 (Tex. Civ. App.), writ of error refused, 529 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. 1975);
Wightman v. American Nat'l Bank, 610 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Wyo. 1980); see also Harris, Non-
negotiable Certificates of Deposit: An Article 9 Problem, 29 UCLA L. REv. 330, 363-75
(1981).
125. U.C.C. § 3-306 (1978). The relevant parts provide:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the instru-
ment subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an action on a
simple contract.
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instruments,126 section 3-805 makes the provisions of article 3, ex-
cept those relating to holders in due course, applicable to any in-
strument "which is otherwise negotiable within this Article but
which is not payable to order or to bearer."127
The court in Bornstein rejected this argument because it deter-
mined that the CD was not "otherwise negotiable." The court
noted that negotiability requires that the instrument contain an
"unconditional promise to pay a sum certain."'1 28 Like most CDs,
the one in issue permitted assignment only with consent of the
bank. The court therefore concluded that the promise to pay was
not unconditional, and that section 3-805 did not apply. Because
no other arguments were presented, the court held that the se-
cured creditor took the CD free of the issuing bank's setoff rights.
Despite its attempt to properly interpret the Code, the Florida
court's analysis suffers from two flaws. First, the decision sets up
two rather bizarre anomalies. If the bank had provided security for
its debt obligation on the CD, then the certificate and security
agreement together would have constituted chattel paper. 12 As an
obligor on chattel paper, the bank would have been an account
debtor, entitled to the protections of section 9-318(1). By giving up
more rights (i.e., security for its debt) the bank would have had
more rights. On the other hand, if the CD had not restricted as-
signments, it would have been "otherwise negotiable." Section 3-
805 would have applied, allowing section 3-306 to restrict the se-
cured creditor's rights. Thus, by retaining fewer rights, the bank
would have had greater rights. An analysis that interprets the
Code as functioning in such a manner is hard to accept.
Second, the court determined that article 9 controlled the prior-
ity of setoff claims.130 More recently, the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota concluded that non-Code law should govern priority disputes
between secured creditors and parties seeking to effect setoff."'
126. See id. § 3-102(1)(e).
127. Id. § 3-805.
128. Id. § 3-104(1)(b).
129. See supra note 122 (defining chattel paper).
130. 374 So. 2d at 10. The court then implicitly relied on U.C.C. § 201 (1978) in ruling
that the secured creditor's rights defeated the setoff rights of other creditors.
131. State Bank v. First Bank, 320 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Minn. 1982).
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The Minnesota court held further that an issuer of a CD could
effect setoff before paying a creditor secured in that certificate." 2
The question of whether article 9 controls the priority of setoff
rights stems from section 9-104(i), which provides: "This Article
does not apply to any right of setoff.' ' 133 Professor Gilmore, one of
the principal draftsmen of article 9, viewed this provision nar-
rowly, as a mere declaration that setoff is not a security interest.
To him, this point was so obvious that it should have been omit-
ted.134 Many courts have adopted the Florida Supreme Court's po-
sition, concluding that section 9-201 still governs the priority of
security interests over setoff rights.1 35 Other courts have implied as
much.136 The existence of section 306(4)(d)(i), which would appear
superfluous if section 9-201 were not to generally subordinate set-
off rights to perfected security interests, supports this result. How-
ever, several courts have interpreted section 9-104(i) more broadly,
as totally excluding setoff rights from the coverage of article 9.
They have concluded, therefore, that non-Code law should deter-
132. See also Kaw Valley State Bank & Trust v. Commercial Bank, 567 S.W.2d 710 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978); Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Spur Second Bank, 705 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986) (both permitting setoff of CD pledged as collateral). Contra Citibank v. Interfirst
Bank, 784 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1986); First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Midland Nat'l Bank, 76 Wis. 2d
662, 251 N.W.2d 829 (1977) (both denying setoff of a collateralized CD on vague mutuality
principles); and Republican Valley Bank v. Security State Bank, 229 Neb. 338, 426 N.W.2d
529 (1988) (denying setoff because bank learned of pledge after setoff rights accrued but
before setoff effected).
133. U.C.C. § 9-104(i) (1978); cf. id. § 9-306(4)(d)(i) (subjecting a security interest in de-
posited and commingled proceeds to setoff rights).
134. 1 G. GILMORE, SEcuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.8 (1965).
135. University C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317, 325 (E.D. Mo.
1973); Continental Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 251 Ga. 412, 414, 306 S.E.2d 285, 287 (1983);
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 177 Ind. App. 548, 556-59, 380 N.E.2d 1243,
1247-48 (1978); Coachmen Indus., Inc. v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 329 N.W.2d 648, 650
(Iowa 1983); Southeastern Fin. Corp. v. National Bank, 145 Mich. App. 717, 720-21, 377
N.W.2d 900, 900-01 (1985); Associates Discount Corp. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 111 N.J.
Super. 353, 357-58, 268 A.2d 330, 332 (1970); Insley Mfg. Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717
P.2d 1341, 1344-47 (Utah 1986); see also Note, supra note 97, at 462-65.
136. Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Southwire Co., 713 F.2d 684 (l1th Cir. 1983);
Farns Assocs., Inc. v. South Side Bank, 93 Ill. App. 3d 766, 417 N.E.2d 818 (1981); Morris
Plan Co. v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 598 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Anderson, Clayton
& Co. v. First Am. Bank, 614 P.2d 1091 (Okla. 1980); see also Rauer, Conflicts Between Set-
Offs and Article 9 Interests, 39 STAN. L. REv. 235, 244 & n.31 (1986).
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mine the priority of setoff rights. 37 Other courts have expressly
declined to decide the issue. 38
This Article need not resolve whether article 9 or any other por-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code speaks to the priority of set-
off rights. After all, the Article ends with a draft legislative propo-
sal that resolves such priority disputes. If the priorities provided
for in that proposal are compatible with the policies of the Code
and consonant with general commercial practices, 39 effort is better
directed at determining the priorities that make the most sense.
In this context, three related principles stand out. First, a person
generally should not be able to assign rights which that person
does not have. Second, a person should not be able to frustrate the
reasonable commercial expectations of creditors through his or her
unilateral action. Third, the Bankruptcy Code and Uniform Com-
mercial Code treatment of creditor rights should be harmonized. A
priority system founded on these principles will have much to rec-
ommend it. 40
137. Citibank v. Interfirst Bank, 784 F.2d 619, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1986) (based on Texas
law); State Bank v. First Bank, 320 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Minn. 1982); Bank of Crystal Springs
v. First Nat'l Bank, 427 So. 2d 968, 971 (Miss. 1983); Republican Valley Bank v. Security
State Bank, 229 Neb. 339, 341, 426 N.W.2d 529, 531 (1988); First Nat'l Bank v. Lone Star
Life Ins. Co., 529 S.W.2d 67, 68 (Tex. 1975); see also Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in
a Debtor's Bank Account Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1977 S. ILL.
U.L.J. 120, 204.
Most courts interpreting § 9-104(b), which removes landlord liens from the scope of arti-
cle 9, have concluded that the priority provisions of article 9 do not govern conflicts between
landlord liens and perfected security interests. See Bates & Springer of Arizona, Inc. v.
Friermood, 109 Ariz. 203, 507 P.2d 668 (1973); Dwyer v. Cooksville Grain Co., 117 Ill. App.
3d 1001, 454 N.E.2d 357 (1983); Perkins v. Farmers Trust & Sav. Bank, 421 N.W.2d 553
(Iowa 1988); Hartwell v. Hartwell Co., 167 N.J. Super. 90, 400 A.2d 529 (1979); National Inv.
Trust v. First Nat'l Bank, 88 N.M. 514, 543 P.2d 482 (1985); Associates Fin. Serv., Inc. v.
Solomon, 523 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). But see Peterson v. Ziegler, 39 Ill. App. 3d
379, 350 N.E.2d 356 (1976) (disapproved of in Dwyer).
138. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 626 F.2d 764, 769-70
(10th Cir. 1980); National Acceptance Co. v. Virginia Capital Bank, 498 F. Supp. 1078, 1083-
85 (E.D. Va. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 673 F.2d 1314 (4th Cir. 1981).
139. See discussion supra text accompanying note 98, regarding resolution of priority
conflicts without reference to mutuality concepts.
140. These three principles are not too dissimilar from the "first-in-time," "ostensible
ownership," and "derivation" principles suggested in Rauer's article as the ones by which
priority disputes should be resolved. See Rauer, supra note 136, at 236-37 & 245-47. The
first principle listed is, essentially, Rauer's derivation principle. The second principle is sim-
ilar to ostensible ownership. The third certainly includes a first-in-time aspect.
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The cases holding that a garnishor takes subject to the setoff
rights of the garnishee are helpful in illustrating the first two prin-
ciples. Almost all of these decisions involved a judgment creditor
possessing a valid judgment lien on all of the judgment debtor's
property, including the debt obligation owed by the garnishee.""
Yet in none of those cases was the judgment lien sufficient to
prime pre-existing setoff rights. This result makes perfect sense.
Setoff rights would amount to little if any subsequent judgment
lien could defeat them, particularly a lien arising from a suit that a
defendant/debtor declined to defend, or from a proceeding of
which a creditor with setoff rights had no notice.
Setoff rights would be similarly inconsequential if the unilateral
assignment of one of the debts as security for a loan from a third
party could defeat them. Put another way, a contractual lien ac-
quired pursuant to article 9 should not be more pervasive than a
general judgment lien. 142
Moreover, commercial practice does not seem to require a result
different from the one this theoretical analysis suggests. When a
commercial lender is asked to extend credit based on the security
of one or more obligations owed to the borrower, that lender will
routinely value the security by analyzing the borrower's likelihood
of collecting. If the obligors on the debts pledged as security have
setoff rights potentially capable of defeating the rights of the
lender, that is merely one more factor for the lender to consider.
Yet that fact alone will not undermine financing arrangements.
When account debts are purchased, as they are frequently in ac-
counts financing transactions, the purchaser must evaluate the set-
141. See Walters v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 59 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1936), modi-
fied, 9 Cal. 2d 46, 69 P.2d 839 (1937); Coyle v. Pan Am. Bank, 377 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979); First Nat'l Bank v. Sinkler, 170 Ga. App. 668, 317 S.E.2d 897 (1984); Bee Jay's
Truck Stop, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 86 Ill. App. 3d 7, 407 N.E.2d 755 (1980); Hoff-
man Chevrolet, Inc. v. Washington County Nat'l Sav. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 467 A.2d 758
(1983); Blow v. Blow, 134 Mich. App. 408, 350 N.W.2d 890 (1984); Herd v. Ingle, 713 S.W.2d
887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Board of Trustees v. Durable Developers, Inc., 102 Nev. 401, 735
P.2d 736 (1986); cf. Industrial Comm'r v. Five Corners Tavern, Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 639, 393
N.E.2d 1005 (1979) (involving tax warrant accorded status of a judgment lien); In re Taxes
of Bob Dance Chevrolet, 67 N.C. App. 509, 313 S.E.2d 207 (1984) (involving tax lien).
142. See Kaw Valley State Bank & Trust v. Commercial Bank, 567 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978) (a pledgee's interest in collateral is, to the extent of the pledgor's indebtedness,
identical to that of the pledgor).
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off rights of the account debtors because the purchaser takes sub-
ject to such rights. 43
However, the discussion thus far relates only to setoff rights that
accrue prior to perfection of the security interest. Not all security
interests in debts attach after the setoff rights of the debtor be-
come exercisable. For instance, if a person pledges a CD as security
for a debt, and then incurs liability to the bank issuing the CD, the
bank's setoff rights do not clearly warrant priority over the secured
creditor's rights,' particularly if, prior to the time it extended
credit, the bank was given actual notice of the pledge or had con-
structive notice via a filed financing statement. 4 5 After all, if the
secured creditor had contacted the issuing bank prior to extending
credit to inquire about possible setoff rights, the creditor would
have learned that none existed.
Proceeds from collateral are another example of security inter-
ests that may attach before setoff rights accrue. Frequently, a
debtor who has collateralized his inventory will sell some and de-
posit the proceeds in a general bank account. If the debtor also
owes money to that bank, the bank may acquire setoff rights in the
deposited funds. In such a case, the security interest in the depos-
ited funds will have attached and been perfected at the time they
became proceeds of the collateral, prior to the time when setoff
rights accrued. Even if the bank's setoff rights constitute a security
interest, as the Bankruptcy Code provides, that interest will be
subsequent in time to the secured creditor's perfected interest.
In other words, if a depositor gives away a security interest in
the bank's debt to him, which he may if the debt were evidenced
143. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
144. Cf. Kaw Valley State Bank, 567 S.W.2d at 714 (priority of setoff rights expressly
based on the fact that they predated the rights of the secured creditor).
145. Cf. Republican Valley Bank v. Security State Bank, 229 Neb. 339, 426 N.W.2d 529
(1988) (giving the pledgee of a CD priority over the issuing bank's setoff rights because the
pledgee gave notice of its interest, although after setoff rights accrued, before bank affected
setoff).
Because a CD constitutes an instrument, see supra note 124, a security interest in a CD
must be perfected through possession, not filing. U.C.C. §§ 9-304(1), 9-305 (1978). Arguably,
therefore, no creditor would have reason to search the appropriate records for such a financ-
ing statement and the statement should not impose constructive notice.
[Vol. 30:51
THE PROBLEMS WITH SETOFF
by a CD,146 his act cannot bestow more rights than he himself had
unless it creates a holder in due course. However, if he contracted
away a security interest in certain collateral and its proceeds, his
subsequent and unilateral deposit of them in a bank that may
thereby have or thereafter acquire setoff rights should not prime
the attached and perfected security interest in such proceeds.
147
A major exception to the priority of a perfected security interest
in proceeds emanates from comment 2(c) to section 9-306 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which provides:
Where cash proceeds are covered into the debtor's checking ac-
count and paid out in the operation of the debtor's business,
recipients of the funds of course take free of any claim which the
secured party may have in them as proceeds. What has been
said relates to payments and transfers in ordinary course....
One court has held that setoff itself is a transfer in the ordinary
course of a bank's business and allows a bank to take free of a
perfected security interest.1 48 Of course, this ruling overlooks the
fact that setoff is not in the ordinary course of the depositor's busi-
ness.1 49 It also emasculates the security interest in proceeds and
the general priority over setoff that the security interest is to have.
A better conclusion might be that the bank's setoff rights have
priority over the secured creditor's right to proceeds only when a
bank extends new credit in reliance on the deposited proceeds (of
course, if the bank either knew or had reason to know of the secur-
146. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-104(1) (1978) (excluding from the scope of article 9 the transfer of an
interest in a deposit account, except to the extent such account contains proceeds of other
collateral).
147. Cf. Rauer, supra note 136, at 248-53, 260-64. But cf. First Wis. Nat'l Bank v. Mid-
land Nat'l Bank, 76 Wis. 2d 662, 668-70, 251 N.W.2d 829, 832-33 (1977) (rejecting this dis-
tinction but apparently not fully comprehending it).
148. Tuloka Affiliates, Inc. v. Security State Bank, 229 Kan. 544, 627 P.2d 816 (1981).
The dissent in this case seems much better reasoned than the majority opinion. In fact,
many if not most of the setoff cases recently decided by Kansas appellate courts have been
analyzed improperly. See Iowa State Bank v. Bolan, 235 Kan. 175, 679 P.2d 720 (1984)
(bank not permitted to set off debtor's account and held liable for conversion for not honor-
ing checks because funds in account were found to "belong" to the debtor's suppliers, the
payees) (criticized supra note 96); Carson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 776, 635
P.2d 1248 (1981) (assignee of proceeds from chose in action had priority over defendant/
counterclaimant's right to set off judgments).
149. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 F.2d 998, 1003
(7th Cir. 1974) (setoff transfer held not within the ordinary course of business).
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ity interest, such reliance would be unjustified). In fact, sections 9-
308 and 9-309 of the Uniform Commercial Code create this result.
By extending such new credit, the bank is giving new value for the
instruments (money) in its possession. The bank's situation is,
therefore, analogous to a purchaser of these instruments under sec-
tion 9-308(b) and to a holder in due course under section 9-309,
provided the bank satisfies the other criteria expressed in section
3-302.150
In one respect, the results of this analysis seem anomalous. They
suggest that a secured creditor's interest in collateral, such as a
CD, is more easily primed than its interest in proceeds of collat-
eral, such as deposited proceeds of inventory. Upon further reflec-
tion, however, one can see that the analysis is, if not formally
based upon, at least inherently compatible with the principle un-
derlying section 9-312(5) of the Uniform Commercial Code: first in
time prevails. By effectively characterizing setoff as a security in-
terest (perfected at the moment mutual debts exist and otherwise
qualify for setoff), relative priorities can easily be resolved by de-
termining whether the bank's interest preceded that of the creditor
secured pursuant to article 9.
Several courts and commentators have rejected such treatment
on conceptual grounds. They have concluded that a person cannot
have a security interest in one's own property or indebtedness, as a
bank would have if it were permitted to maintain a security inter-
est in deposited funds.'5 ' Yet such theoretical objections ignore re-
ality by failing to acknowledge the real security that setoff rights
150. For some unexpressed reason, the notice elements of §§ 3-302 & 9-308(b) are not
identical. See U.C.C. § 9-308 comment 2 (1978) ("a purchaser of a negotiable instrument
might prevail under clause (b) even though his knowledge of the conflicting proceeds claim
precluded his having holder in due course status").
151. See 1 W. SCHLICHTING, T. RicE, J. COOPER & S. CHAZIN, BANKING LAW § 11.03 (1985);
Clark, supra note 67, at 198; Mitchell, supra note 13, at 163 & n.53; TeSelle, supra note 74,
at 41. See also cases cited supra note 15, noting that funds deposited with a bank generally
become property of the bank.
Although setoff rights have often been characterized as a "banker's lien," e.g., Kane v.
First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.2d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 1932), many authorities distinguish the two by
suggesting that such a lien properly applies only to tangible personal property, often securi-
ties, in the possession of the bank. Clark, supra note 67, at 197-98; TeSelle, supra note 74,
at 40-41.
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can give a bank or other mutual creditor.'52 As one author ob-
served aptly, "[f]aced with the fact that the commercial world
views the bank's right of setoff as the equivalent of a security de-
vice, it makes little sense to give decisive weight to the rather met-
aphysical objection that one cannot have an interest in one's own
indebtedness."' 53
CONCLUSION
Up to this point, this Article has provided little more than a cur-
sory review of existing law and the issues and inconsistencies that
lie hidden and not so hidden therein. In part because the issues
and inconsistencies exist and are important, the call for a uniform
law of setoff is now almost ten years old.'" What follows is a re-
sponse to that call.
This response attempts to resolve the problems with the current
law of setoff identified above. In this effort, the proposed statute
establishes a procedure by which setoff may be effected, mandates
notice to the party against whom setoff is effected, and, through
this, fixes a time from which potential fraudulent transfers and
bankruptcy preferences can be measured.
More importantly, the proposed Act tries to maintain a distinc-
tion between mutuality and priority issues. In performing this
task, the Act treats setoff rights as a security interest and adopts
the general rule that the first to perfect such an interest prevails.
This analysis helps to harmonize the Bankruptcy Code treatment
of setoff with the Uniform Commercial Code treatment. In addi-
tion, it is intended to comport with prevailing commercial prac-
tices and common sense.
The Act is not perfect. For example, as is true under existing
law, a bank with setoff rights against one of its depositors may
have no way to ascertain readily and reliably whether another
creditor of the depositor has rights superior to the account depos-
152. See United States v. Harris, 249 F. Supp. 221, 224 (W.D. La. 1966) (allowing bank a
security interest in deposited funds).
153. Mitchell, supra note 13, at 166-67; see also CAL. COM. CODE §§ 9104, 9302(1)(g)
(West Supp. 1988) (which, contrary to the U.C.C., permit a creditor to have a security inter-
est in a deposit account, even where the account is maintained with that creditor).
154. See Note, supra note 97, at 472.
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its. Yet, while failing in the herculean task of solving all potential
problems and inequities, the Act should solve more problems that
it creates and answer more questions than it raises.
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UNIFORM SETOFF ACT
ARTICLE I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
§ 101 Short Title
This Act shall be known as the Uniform Setoff Act.
§ 102 Applicability
(a) This Act shall apply where a person effecting setoff re-
sides in this State, where the situs of a debt owed to a
person effecting setoff is in this State, or where setoff is
raised as an affirmative defense, counterclaim, or cross-
claim in a court proceeding in this State.
(b) This Act shall replace all common law governing or
concerning setoff and is designed to accompany and
complement the United States Bankruptcy Code and
the Uniform Commercial Code.
COMMENT
As with any code, this legislation is intended to supplant all pre-
existing law on the subject. This remains true regardless of
whether such pre-existing law is consistent or inconsistent with
this Act; all prior common law of setoff is intended to be repealed
by this legislation. Note, however, that basic principles of common
law which apply generally and in a variety of substantive areas,
such as waiver, estoppel, and laches, may have application to mat-
ters and situations otherwise governed by this Act, as may statutes
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or regulations which create special rights or prohibitions with re-
spect to specific debts or types of debts.155
§ 103 Definitions
(a) "Bank" means any person engaged in the business of
banking by accepting deposits of money on account
and for the benefit of its customers.
(b) "Creditor" means a person to whom a debt is owed by a
debtor.
155. See, e.g., In re Metropolitan Int'l, Inc., 616 F.2d 83 (3d Cir. 1980) (regarding waiver
of setoff rights); United Seeds, Inc. v. Eagle Green Corp., 223 Neb. 360, 389 N.W.2d 571
(1986) (bank estopped from exercising setoff).
Other areas of law that may have continuing relevance include: federal law regarding set-
off of credit card debts, 15 U.S.C. § 1666h (1982); truth-in-lending disclosure requirements
and other consumer protection legislation, see Clark, supra note 67, at 199-202; statutes or
regulations that prohibit or restrict an employer from effecting setoff against an employee's
wages, e.g., 8 CAL. CODE REG. § 11040.8 (1984) (prohibiting employers from reducing em-
ployee wage payments by the amount of any loss arising from a cash shortage, breakage, or
equipment loss not caused by a dishonest or willful act); the Bankruptcy Code's exemption
provisions, compare In re Wilde, 85 Bankr. 147, 148-49 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1988) (bank not
permitted to effect setoff against property exempt under § 522 of the Bankruptcy Code) and
In re Pieri, 86 Bankr. 208, 210 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988) (neither California law nor § 522
prohibits setoff against the debtor's exempt property); and various statutes that exempt
certain funds, such as Social Security benefits and worker's compensation payments, from
the reach of creditors. See Note, Bank's Right of Setoff in Virginia, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1603 (1984); Hagedorn, Bank Setoff in Washington - Is it a Right Without Restriction?, 15
GONZ. L. REv. 989, 999-1000 (1980).
Courts have not been uniform in their interpretation of statutory exemptions. Several
have permitted creditors to reach such funds once deposited in a bank, see McCabe v. Fee,
279 Or. 437, 568 P.2d 661 (1977); Bernardini v. Central Nat'l Bank, 223 Va. 519, 290 S.E.2d
863 (1982); John 0. Melby & Co. Bank v. Anderson, 88 Wis. 2d 254, 276 N.W.2d 274 (1978);
although most courts have not. See In re Klein, 10 Bankr. 356 (9th Cir. 1981); Kruger v.
Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974); Barnhill v. Rob-
ert Saunders & Co., 125 Cal. App. 3d 1, 177 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1981); Anderson v. First Nat'l
Bank, 151 Ga. App. 573, 260 S.E.2d 501 (1979); Matthews v. Lewis, 617 S.W.2d 43 (Ky.
1981); Pease v. North Am. Fin. Corp., 69 Mich. App. 165, 244 N.W.2d 400 (1976); Havelock
Bank v. Hog Confinement Systems, Inc., 214 Neb. 783, 335 N.W.2d 765 (1983); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Falcone, 130 N.J. Super. 517, 327 A.2d 699 (1974).
This Act does not resolve the priority conflict that arises when such exempt funds are
deposited in a bank with setoff rights. Resolution of that conflict seems better left to the
statutes that provide the exemption and the policies that underlie them.
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(c) "Debt" means a right to payment, whether or not such
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated,
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, un-
disputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(d) "Debtor" means a person who owes a debt.
(e) "Liquidated" means fixed in amount or readily ascer-
tainable in amount after simple calculation, with or
without reference to additional known or readily ascer-
tainable facts.
(f) "Net Creditor" means a creditor who remains owed af-
ter his debt to a debtor is set off against a debt owed to
him by that debtor.
(g) "Net Debtor" means a debtor who remains indebted af-
ter his debt to a creditor is set off against a debt that
creditor owes him.
(h) "Person" means any individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, personal representative, or trustee recognized by
state law as capable and competent to own property in
his own right. "Person" does not include: the United
States; any State, Commonwealth, District, Territory,
municipality, or foreign state; or any agency, instru-
mentality, or subdivision of the United States or of any
State, Commonwealth, District, Territory, municipal-
ity, or foreign state.
(i) "Setoff" means the right to net a debt owed against a
debt due and have only the difference transferred by or
remain due by the net debtor to the net creditor.
(j) "Situs" means, with reference to debts, the place where
payment on a debt is due.
COMMENT
The definition of "bank" in subsection (a) is taken from section
1-201(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code, but has been modified
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to include only those banks which accept and hold deposits for
customers. It also encompasses the broad number of entities enter-
ing the banking business, including those so-called nonbank banks
which accept deposits and those brokerage houses which are tradi-
tionally thought of as depository banking services.156
The definition of "debt" in subsection (c) is derived from the
definition of "claim" under section 101(4)(A) of the Bankruptcy
Code. It encompasses all rights to payment, however arising, and
should be given the broad interpretation that "claim" has been
given by bankruptcy courts. The part of the bankruptcy definition
of "claim" not included as a "debt" here concerns the right to eq-
uitable remedies. But the mere fact that a person may be entitled
to both the payment of money (whether as legal damages or pursu-
ant to contract) and equitable remedies for the same wrong or obli-
gation is not intended to prevent the payment right from consti-
tuting a "debt."
The term "liquidated" in subsection (e) encompasses not only
sums certain, i.e., amounts owed on promissory notes or pursuant
to a court judgment, but also amounts that need merely be calcu-
lated based on facts which are readily ascertainable and not sub-
ject to reasonable dispute. Examples include contract and rent ob-
ligations or escalations based on a specific index, such as the
Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers, and promissory
notes with interest tied to a base rate (or some increment above or
below a base rate), such as the Federal Funds Rate, a named
bank's prime lending rate, or even a similar rate ordinarily charged
and published by the person effecting setoff or the person against
whom setoff is invoked. In addition, a debt may be liquidated
156. The Drafting Committee on Amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code Current
Payment Methods is apparently considering an expansion of the § 1-201(4) definition to
include all "depository institutions" under 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)(A). Miller, Ballen, Daven-
port & Vergari, Uniform Commercial Code Survey: Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and
Collections, and Commercial Electronic Fund Transfers, 42 Bus. LAw. 1269, 1286 (1987). As
the comment above attempts to show, the definition of "bank" should encompass all such
institutions.
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through estimation, if presented as a bankruptcy claim and esti-
mated by the bankruptcy court.157
A debt need not be characterized as entirely liquidated or en-
tirely unliquidated; it may have both liquidated and unliquidated
portions. Obvious examples include tort injuries, for which the
medical bills may represent a liquidated portion but compensation
for pain and suffering may be unliquidated, and a bank's liability
for wrongful dishonor of a check, for which the amount of the
check probably would be liquidated, but consequential damages
may not. Of course, the mere fact that a debt or a portion of a debt
is liquidated does not mean that it is undisputed, fixed, or
matured.
Pursuant to the definition of "net creditor" in subsection (f), the
party effecting setoff and the party against whom setoff is invoked
may both be net creditors (and, accordingly, both be net debtors).
This can happen, for example, where X owes Y a debt of $200, all
of which is available for setoff, and Y owes X a debt of $300, of
which only $100 is available for setoff (the remaining portion being
either unliquidated, unmatured, contingent, or disputed). If setoff
is effected by Y to the extent of $100, X will still owe Y $100 (all of
which will be available for further setoff) and Y will owe X $200
(none of which will be available for setoff). Both will be net credi-
tors (and net debtors) and will be entitled to enforce the portion of
the debts remaining due as if setoff had never been exercised. See
§§ 302, 303. Note, however, that if X had effected setoff, X would
have been required to include a $100 payment with his notice of
setoff, and, thus, would not have been a net creditor. See § 204(c).
The definition of "person" in subsection (h) is derived from sec-
tions 101(14), 101(24) and 101(33) of the Bankruptcy Code. The
additional language makes an individual acting for another in a
separate legal capacity, such as an executor or trustee, a person
separate from himself. This should make the requirements of mu-
tuality in this Act and in the Bankruptcy Code easier to under-
stand and apply. This provision does not alter, however, the com-
157. See supra notes 73 & 75.
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mon-law rule that the executor of a decedent's estate is, when
acting in such capacity and to the extent necessary to effect setoff,
the same person as the decedent.15 8 Moreover, this subsection does
not change the prevailing bankruptcy rules regarding mutuality. A
bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession is deemed the same
person as the bankruptcy debtor to the extent necessary to permit
setoff of pre-petition claims with pre-petition debts or pre-petition
claims with post-petition debts arising out of the same contract or
transaction.159
The additional language prevents a group or combination of per-
sons (other than through partnership), such as joint tenants or te-
nants by the entirety, from constituting a single person, even when
state law recognizes such group or combination as one capable of
owning property in its own right.
As with the Bankruptcy Code, the exclusion of governmental
units is made explicit in order to avoid any confusion that may
arise, particularly if, for example, a municipality is incorporated
and thus is legally a corporation. °0 Such exclusion also seems nec-
essary to permit the state and federal governments to limit the
scope of setoff against them, to assign superior priority to their
own setoff rights, and to avoid conflict with the various state stat-
utes, policies, and immunities that frequently apply when a gov-
158. See Comment, supra note 2, at 266, and cases cited therein.
159. See, e.g., In re Elsinore Shore Assocs. v. First Fidelity Bank, 67 Bankr. 926, 936
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (pre-petition claims and debts and post-petition claims and debts may
be set off, but pre-petition obligations may not be set off against post-petition obligations);
see also In re T & B Gen. Contracting, Inc., 64 Bankr. 291, 293 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986) (no
mutuality between a pre-petition debt and a post-petition claim); In re Garcia, 23 Bankr.
266, 267-68 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (no mutuality between a pre-petition claim and a post-petition
debt); In re All-Brite Sign Serv. Co., 11 Bankr. 409, 411-13 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981) ("The
filing of the petition marks the time at which mutuality ceases," and any money deposited
thereafter, or check collected thereafter, although deposited pre-petition, is unavailable for
setoff); accord In re Nelson, 6 Bankr. 248, 249-50 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (pre-petition claim
and post-petition debt in Chapter 7 proceeding). Apparently, the rule prohibiting setoff of
pre-petition obligations against post-petition obligations does not apply when the obliga-
tions arise out of the same contract, so that recoupment would be available. See cases cited
infra note 165.
160. See H.R. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 811-14 (1977).
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ernmental agency attempts to effect setoff. 6' Accordingly, the rela-
tive priority of setoff rights to a tax lien or levy, although perhaps
indirectly affected, is not expressly covered by this Act. Resolution
of such conflicting rights is left to the law of the taxing
authority. 162
Moreover, by omitting governments from the scope of this Act,
no need exists to determine which agencies and instrumentalities
will be treated as the same person for mutuality purposes, 6 ' and
setoff, as defined, will involve no state action.164 This obviates the
need to consider and address due process concerns.
"Setoff" is purposefully defined broadly in subsection (i) and en-
compasses the common law of recoupment as well as setoff. Ac-
cordingly, this Act supplants the common law of recoupment. See
§ 102(b). Moreover, this legislation abrogates all differences be-
tween recoupment and setoff. Any relevance the distinction may
still have is limited to situations that this Act does not reach.'65
161. See, e.g., FDIC v. Smith, 466 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (protecting the FDIC
from setoff); Ainsworth v. Cincotta, 79 Or. App. 574, 721 P.2d 455 (1986) (implementing
state policy regarding insurance companies); Bonelli v. State, 71 Cal. App. 3d 459, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 486 (1977) (protecting retirement benefits from setoff).
162. Cf. Peoples Nat'l Bank v. United States, 777 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985) (IRS notice of
levy defeated bank's setoff rights); Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank v. United States, 657 F.2d 36 (3d
Cir. 1981) (IRS notice of levy primed by bank's automatic setoff); United States v. Citizens
& S. Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) (IRS notice of levy defeats bank's subsequent
effort to effect setoff), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); Almi, Inc. v. Dick Corp., 31 Pa.
Commw. 26, 375 A.2d 1343 (1977) (IRS lien primed by garnishor's setoff rights); see also 26
U.S.C. § 6323(a), (h)(1) (1982) (regarding the relative priority of federal tax liens and secur-
ity interests).
163. See In re Rinehart, 76 Bankr. 746, 749-55 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987) and cases cited
therein.
164. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st Cir.
1974); Bichel Optical Labs., Inc. v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, 487 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1973);
Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank, 11 Cal. 3d 352, 521 P.2d 441, 113 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1974); Meyer
v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 96 Idaho 208, 525 P.2d 990 (1974); Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Lee,
344 So. 2d 16 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Nietzel v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 307 Minn.
147, 238 N.W.2d 437 (1976); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 10
Wash. App. 530, 518 P.2d 734 (1974).
165. Cf. In re Buttes Resources Co., 89 Bankr. 613 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (creditor with recoup-
ment rights was not restricted by § 553 of Bankruptcy Code and was permitted to recoup
pre-petition claim from both pre-petition and post-petition debts); In re Mohawk Indus.,
Inc., 82 Bankr. 174, 177 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (where recoupment lies, a pre-petition claim
and post-petition debt may be netted out: "if a debtor seeks the benefit of a contract it
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For instance, the distinction between setoff and recoupment may
remain important when a governmental unit or agency is one of
the parties involved. But cf. § 103(g) (defining "person" so as to
exclude governmental units and agencies). By bringing suit, a gov-
ernmental body may be waiving sovereign immunity to claims aris-
ing out of the same transaction or occurrence, thereby permitting a
defendant to obtain recoupment, at least to the extent of the gov-
ernment's recovery. Sovereign immunity to unrelated claims may
not be waived. 6 The Act proposed here does not address this is-
sue and leaves the availability of setoff by and against governmen-
tal units, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and the circum-
stances under which that immunity may be waived to other areas
of law.
A debt need not arise in a forum state in order to have a situs in
that state. The only requirement is that payment on the debt be
due in the forum state. State law may vary on where payments are
deemed due, but often -payment is due wherever the contract or
instrumeit directs or, in the absence of such direction, wherever
the creditor resides.167 Note that pursuant to section 2-310(a) of
the Uniform Commercial Code, if a contract for the sale of goods is
must take the burden under that contract as well"); In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium,
Inc., 22 Bankr. 427, 432-33 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (recoupment not subject to the limita-
tions on setoff in § 553 of the Bankruptcy Code); Waldschmidt v. CBS, Inc., 14 Bankr. 309,
313-14 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (same rule under old Bankruptcy Act).
To the extent recoupment means any setoff right arising from a single transaction or oc-
currence, section 403(b) of this Act does give such rights a priority over previously perfected
security interests. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
166. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1982); EEOC
v. First Nat'l Bank, 614 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1980); FDIC v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co.,
592 F.2d 364, 372-73 (7th Cir. 1979); Frederick v. United States, 386 F.2d 481, 487-88 (5th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Gold Mountain Coffee, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 215, 217-19 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 594 F. Supp. 466, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
In re American Export Lines, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 956, 961-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
167. E.g., Katz v. Richard Plumer Co., 479 So. 2d 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Engi-
neered Storage Sys., Inc. v. National Partitions & Interiors, Inc., 415 So. 2d 114, 114-15 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Lucas Enters., Inc. v. Paul C. Harman Co., 273 Pa. Super. 422, 425, 417
A.2d 720, 721-22 (1980); Insituform of N. Am., Inc. v. Miller Insituform, Inc., 695 S.W.2d
198, 200 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); cf. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, DRAFT AMENDMENTS TO UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Article 3 (March 31, 1988) [here-
inafter DRAFT AMENDMENTS] § 3-111 (making an instrument payable at the business or resi-
dence of the maker or drawee if the instrument is otherwise silent as to the place of
payment).
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silent as to the time and place of payment, payment is due at the
time when, and at the place where, the buyer is to receive the
goods (even if different from the time and place title is delivered).
Presumably, the rule remains the same even when the seller agrees
to sell on credit, thereby modifying the Uniform Commercial Code
default time of payment; unless that agreement also changes the
place of payment, payment will remain due where the buyer is to
receive the goods.
By adding this definition to the Act, along with that portion of
section 102(a) which references situs, persons conducting business
in several states may take advantage of the provisions of this Act
by requiring that payments due under the contracts they execute
and the instruments they accept be due in a jurisdiction which has
enacted this Act.
§ 104 Rules of Construction
(a) "Includes" and "including" are not limiting.
(b) "Or" is not exclusive.
(c) Masculine pronouns are for convenience only, they are
not limiting.
§ 105 Obligation of Good Faith
This Act imposes an obligation of good faith. All conduct, whether
by act or omission, pursuant to any right, authorization, duty, or
obligation provided for herein, is subject to this requirement.
COMMENT
This requirement is based upon section 1-203 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and should be interpreted similarly. A basic
principle underlying the entire Act is that all commercial dealing
requires good faith. Particular application of this general principle
is found in section 306, but the concept applies more broadly.
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ARTICLE II - SETOFF PROCEDURE
§ 201 When Right Available
(a) Unless otherwise agreed, a creditor may set off only
mutual debts.
(b) Debts are mutual if every creditor owed is a primary
obligor on the other debt or has consented to the exer-
cise of setof .
COMMENT
Assuming the debts are matured, liquidated, fixed, and undis-
puted (or that any defect is properly waived), see § 202, this sec-
tion is intended to operate as follows:
Example (1). A owes X; X owes A.
Either A or X may effect setoff.
Example (2). A & B jointly owe X; X owes A & B jointly.
Any of the three may effect setoff.
Example (3). A & B jointly owe X; X owes A.
A or X may effect setoff. B may not because he is not a creditor,
as required by subsection (a). To permit B to effect setoff would
entitle him to have only A make payment (up to the amount set-
off), irrespective of their rights against each other. Although the
equities may be settled later through contribution rights, permit-
ting B to so control the situation seems unfair.
Example (4). A owes X; X owes A & B jointly.
B is a creditor who is not also a primary obligor, as required by
subsection (b). Accordingly, setoff is not proper without B's con-
sent. Such consent may be directed at a particular exercise of set-
off or may be given generally at the time one or more of the under-
lying debts was created.
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Example (5). A owes X; X owes B.
If B has consented to the exercise of setoff, then mutuality exists
and X may effect that right. Although A is technically not a credi-
tor of X, B's consent essentially operates to assign B's rights
against X to A. Thus, for the purpose of subsection (a), both A and
B can be deemed to be creditors of X. Accordingly, with the appro-
priate manifestation of consent, A and B, or either of them, may
also effect setoff, provided such action does not violate any of the
rules in section 203.
If A alone effects setoff, consent would be manifested appropri-
ately only if notification of such consent is transmitted to X in a
reasonably reliable manner, i.e., by B or above B's signature and
prior to or with the notice of setoff. Otherwise, X might reasonably
believe A's action to be improper, and unnecessary disputes might
result.
Example (6). A owes X; X owes A, as trustee.
Pursuant to section 103(h) and the comment thereto, A as a
trustee is a person distinct from A in his individual capacity. No
mutuality exists here and setoff is not proper. If, however, the ben-
eficiaries and the settlor consent, then Example (5) may govern the
situation.
Example (7). Partnership owes X; X owes Partner.
Pursuant to the Uniform Partnership Act, setoff is not permitted
because Partner is only secondarily liable for Partnership debts. If,
however, Partner consents, then Example (5) may again govern the
situation.
Example (8). Partner owes X; X owes Partnership.
Setoff is not permitted. Again, consent by Partnership (mani-
fested by a partner other than the one owing X) may bring the
situation within Example (5).
Example (9). A & B jointly owe X; X & Y jointly owe A.
This pattern will probably not arise often. Nevertheless, all the
creditors (A and X) are primary obligors. The exercise of setoff
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cannot possibly harm B and Y. Accordingly, both A and X may
effect setoff.
This Act does not expressly cover the mutuality problem
presented by so called "special deposits." This section and section
103(h) suggest that a bank may not set off funds in a deposit ac-
count against a debt owed by the titular owner of that account, if,
in fact, the owner is acting in a fiduciary capacity for another. The
mere fact, however, that deposited funds are covered by a per-
fected security interest or subject to some other lien does not mean
that they are held for the benefit of another. The rights of credi-
tors are addressed in the sections on priorities, see §§ 401-403, and
nothing is gained by confusing the concepts of priority and mutu-
ality.168 Special deposits should include only those funds deposited
by a person acting in a true trust relationship for another. Such a
trust may be express, implied, or constructive, but unless it is
binding on the depositor, it should not affect the bank's setoff
rights.1 19 Nevertheless, the amount of notice to the bank and the
level of agreement by the bank necessary to create a special de-
posit and destroy mutuality, and the degree of reliance by the
bank necessary to overcome such lack of mutuality, is left to local
law and article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code.170 Moreover,
this Act does not cover the damages available for wrongfully using
168. See supra note 97.
169. Compare In re Goodson Steel Corp., 488 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1974) (account desig-
nated as "Payroll Account" but on which depositor could draw freely contained general, not
special, deposits); In re Andrews, 33 Bankr. 197 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (setoff properly
invoked against Totten trust deposits); and National Bank v. Weiner, 180 Ga. App. 61, 348
S.E.2d 492 (1986) (setoff of funds in an escrow account not improper), with In re Todd, 37
Bankr. 836 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1984) (bank may not setoff against depositor's individual debt
any funds in depositor's Individual Retirement Account). See also Filosa v. Pecora, 44 ll.
App. 3d 912, 358 N.E.2d 1213 (1976) (bank setoff not proper against escrowed funds).
170. Cf. In re Goodson Steel Corp., 488 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1974) (designation and use of
account as one for payroll, absent agreement of bank, insufficient to make deposits therein
special or otherwise create a trust fund); United States ex rel. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v.
Tri-County Bank, 415 F. Supp. 858, 868 (D.S.D. 1976) (maintenance of separate accounts
for each federal grant received insufficient indication that bank had agreed to any special
conditions on the deposits therein); see also Berg v. Union State Bank, 186 Minn. 529, 243
N.W. 696 (1932); Brady v. American Nat'l Bank, 120 Okla. 159, 250 P. 1006 (1926) (both
holding that detrimental reliance by bank needed before deposited funds can be set off
against trustee/depositor's individual debt).
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special deposits to effect setoff. Cf. § 305(c), which governs a setoff
lacking one of the requirements of section 202(a).
§ 202 Scope of Right
(a) Unless otherwise agreed, setoff may be effected only to
the extent the debt owed to the person effecting setoff
is matured as to time, fixed as to all contingencies, un-
disputed by all primary obligors, and liquidated in
amount.
(b) Unless otherwise agreed, the debt owed by the person
effecting setoff may be unmatured, contingent, dis-
puted, or unliquidated. To the extent any such debt is
set off, such action accelerates to maturity any unma-
tured debt, waives any contingencies to or dispute of
liability, and liquidates the amount.
(c) For the purpose of this section, a debt is matured to
the extent the debtor is insolvent, unless such insol-
vency preceded the creation of the debt.
COMMENT
Absent agreement or consent, setoff is unavailable for any por-
tion of a debt owed to the person effecting setoff that is unmatured
as to time, contingent on any acts which have not yet been per-
formed or on any events which have not yet happened, disputed as
to liability by any primary obligor, or unliquidated in amount.
Only those debts or portions of debts free of these defects may be
set off against a mutual debt. Yet, just as an unliquidated debt can
be liquidated through estimation by a bankruptcy court, see com-
ment to § 103(e), a bankruptcy court can also fix a contingent
debt,"' and ripen an unmatured debt,-"2 to permit setoff. More-
over, in the event a bankruptcy petition is not filed, and in order to
171. See In re Flanagan Bros., Inc., 47 Bankr. 299 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1985); In re Morristown
Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 42 Bankr. 413 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984); see also supra note 73.
172. See In re Isis Foods, Inc., 24 Bankr. 75 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982).
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permit private setoff prior to bankruptcy court involvement, sub-
section (c) preserves the prevailing common-law rule that if a
debtor is insolvent, setoff of an otherwise unmatured debt is
permissible. 171
These restrictions do not apply to debts owed by the person ef-
fecting setoff because such defects are generally waivable, and
thus, such restrictions are unnecessary to prevent undue detri-
ment. In order to promote private settlements and the use of set-
off, however, no admission, acceleration, or waiver, implied by the
mere act of setoff, shall operate on any debt remaining after setoff.
Moreover, if necessary, jurisdictions should modify their rules of
evidence so that no such implied admission or waiver will be ad-
missible into evidence in an action for further relief pursuant to
section 302.
If the person effecting setoff has a co-obligor, setoff of an unma-
tured, contingent, disputed, or unliquidated debt may operate to
such co-obligor's detriment (to the extent that contribution rights
remain or to the extent that the co-obligor was a creditor on the
other debt). General principles of agency govern such co-obligor's
rights. If the person effecting setoff has at least apparent authority
to bind the co-obligor, such setoff should remain effective.
§ 203 Special Rules
(a) Delegated Debts
(1) The delegate of a contractual debt may set off
against the contract creditor only those debts
owed by the creditor to the delegate which arise
after the creditor receives notice of the delega-
tion, or those other debts which arise out of the
contract.
173. See supra note 68.
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(2) A creditor may set off against the delegate of a
contractual debt any debt owed to the delegator
arising before the creditor receives notice of the
delegation, any debt owed to the delegate arising
after receipt of such notice, or any other debt
which arises out of the contract.
(b) Assigned Rights
(1) The assignee of a right to payment on a debt
may set off against the debtor only those debts
owed by the assignee to the debtor that arise af-
ter the debtor receives notice of the assignment,
or those other debts that arise out of the same
transaction or contract that created the debtor's
debt.
(2) Except as provided in section 401, a debtor may
set off against the assignee of a right to payment
on a debt any debt owed by the assignor arising
before the debtor receives notice of the assign-
ment, any debt owed by the assignee arising after
receipt of such notice, or any other debt which
arises out of the same transaction or contract
that created the debtor's debt.
(c) Consent
If debts become mutual through the application of con-
sent pursuant to section 201(b), and if such consent
was not given at or prior to the time such debts arose,
then setoff shall be deemed to occur after a delegation
of duties or an assignment of rights, whichever is ap-
propriate.
(d) Wrongfully Acquired Debts
A person who incurs a debt through some fraudulent or
illegal means and for the purpose of effecting setoff
may not use such debt to set off another debt.
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(e) Matured, Fixed, Undisputed, & Liquidated Debts
Nothing in this section impairs or modifies the limita-
tions on setoff in sections 201 and 202.
COMMENT
Paragraph (a)(1) restricts the selling of debt obligations to those
who can make special use of them because they already are owed a
debt by the creditor. Paragraph (b)(1) restricts the selling of rights
to receive payment to those who can make special use of them be-
cause they already owe a debt to the debtor.
The former is particularly troublesome when the creditor is in-
solvent; the latter when the debtor is in default or is insolvent. In
such instances, the use of setoff can have a markedly preferential
effect over other creditors. Even beyond insolvency situations, the
unrestricted exercise of setoff after the transfer of a debt can dis-
rupt cash flow with an unexpected swiftness other uses of setoff
cannot match.
Although section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code does restrict the
preferential effect which transferred debts can produce,174 the pro-
visions here are drafted with sufficient breadth to apply outside of
bankruptcy and insolvency situations, and to avoid interference
with the reasonable expectations of the debtor/creditor not party
to the delegation or assignment. As such, they do not apply if a
novation has occurred (at which point a Bankruptcy Code prefer-
ence attack would have a much greater chance of success).
Paragraphs (a)(2) and (b)(2) make clear that the rights of any-
one not party to the assignment or delegation will not be dimin-
ished by such transfer. To the contrary, to a minor degree, setoff
rights are enhanced by the availability of debts owed to or by the
delegate or assignee. Aside from this minor enhancement, para-
graph (b)(2) comports with section 9-318(1) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code.
174. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 25, at 496-501.
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Paragraph (b)(2) has the concomitant effect of resolving the pri-
ority conflict arising from assignments of nonnegotiable certificates
of deposit. Because such certificates are nonnegotiable, an assignee
will not acquire the rights of a holder in due course. Accordingly,
the issuing bank will be free to use the obligation owing on the
certificate to set off any debt the assignor owes the bank, provided
such debt meets the requirements of section 202(a) and provided
such debt was not created after notice of the assignment was re-
ceived.17 5 Cf. § 403(c), regarding priorities when the debt evidenced
by a CD is pledged as security.
A debt that is renewed after notice of assignment is received
should probably be treated as not having arisen prior to the receipt
of such notice. In such a case, the bank knows of the assignment
and therefore cannot reasonably rely on the certificate indebted-
ness for security. Of course, if renewal were required by contract, it
should not affect a bank's setoff rights.
Subsection (c) deals with situations like those in Examples (5)
through (8) of the comment to section 201. Consent may expand
the scope of the right to setoff. But, just as an assignment or dele-
gation should not operate to the detriment of a person not a party
to such transfer, consent should not detrimentally affect a noncon-
senting party. Accordingly, consent is to be tested under the same
rules as a delegation or assignment. If in Example (5), Y consents
to the exercise of setoff, such consent should be treated as an as-
signment of Y's right to receive payment on a debt. If such consent
preceded the transactions or occurrences which created both debts,
however, then the exercise of setoff cannot frustrate X's reasonable
expectations, and the situation need not be treated as an
assignment.
175. The rule of § 203(b)(2) extends to any transfer of an instrument, whether negotiable
or nonnegotiable, in which the transferee fails to qualify as a holder in due course. This rule
is similar, but not identical, to the rule proposed in the draft amendments to article 3.
Pursuant to the draft amendments, a holder not qualifying as a holder in due course will be
subject to setoff for the claims of the obligor arising out of "the transaction that gave rise to
the instrument," but not to other claims of the obligor against the payee that predate the
assignment. DRAFT AMENDMENTS, supra note 167, § 3-305.
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Subsection (d) adopts and expands the rule of Brunswick Corp.
v. Clements, 424 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1970), that "a creditor of a
bankrupt should not be permitted to pay himself through the de-
vice of setoff by converting the bankrupt's property, particularly at
a time when he knows of the bankrupt's insolvency." Although sec-
tion 553 of the Bankruptcy Code effectively limits most instances
of such conduct, subsection (d) is necessary in case no bankruptcy
filing is made or in case the debt is incurred more than 90 days
before a bankruptcy filing.17
Subsection (e) is presumably unnecessary, but is added merely
to avoid any possible confusion. Phrases in subsections (a) and (b)
such as "may set off.., any debt" mean any debt otherwise quali-
fying for setoff under sections 201 and 202. Nothing in section 203
is intended to expand the scope of setoff beyond mutual debts or
to remove the requirement that debts owed to the party effecting
setoff be matured (or be owed by an insolvent), fixed, undisputed,
and liquidated.
§ 204 Procedure to Effect Right
(a) Setoff shall be effected by sending written notice
thereof to every creditor owed on one or more of the
debts involved.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (d), setoff shall be ef-
fective upon dispatch of the notice required in subsec-
tion (a), or, if more than one such notice is required,
upon the dispatch of the last of such notices, provided:
(1) Each such notice is sent in a manner reasonably
certain to result in delivery within five calendar
days;
176. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2), (d)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (generally making such ac-
tion avoidable by bankruptcy trustee as a fraudulent transfer).
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(2) Any account or book entry customarily used to
record the setoff is made within a reasonable
time thereafter; and
(3) The requirements of subsection (c) are satisfied.
(c) Any person effecting setoff who, but for this subsection,
would be a net debtor, must include with the notice re-
quired by subsection (a):
(1) (A) Remittance of that portion of his net debt
which is matured as to time, fixed as to all
contingencies, undisputed by all primary
obligors, and liquidated in amount, unless
such person is insolvent or is a bank effect-
ing setoff against a depositor; or
(B) A statement of the amount remaining in
the deposit account, available for with-
drawal by the depositor, if such person is a
bank effecting setoff against a depositor;
and
(2) A description of exact nature and extent of any
dispute, contingency, or lack of maturity or liqui-
dation, to which the net debt remains subject.
(d) Unless otherwise agreed, no other acts or events shall
be necessary to effect setoff. If, by agreement, other
acts or events are necessary, setoff shall be effective
upon the latter of:
(1) Dispatch of all notices required by subsection (a),
provided the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1),
(2) & (3) are satisfied; or
(2) Performance of all the additional acts and occur-
rence of all the additional events required by
agreement.
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COMMENT
This section specifies the action necessary to accomplish setoff7
and therefore sets a time by which preferences and fraudulent
transfers can be measured and sharpens the focus through which
priorities can be determined. In addition, it should make bank-
ruptcy stay issues easier to resolve; merely freezing a bankruptcy
debtor's account will not constitute setoff and therefore should es-
cape the prohibition in section 362(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.
This result is desirable because it prevents a flood of emergency
stay litigation from banks trying to protect their setoff rights from
the withdrawal of funds, and alleviates the conflict with the section
363 restrictions on the use of cash collateral.
Unlike most other provisions of this Act, subsection (a) imposes
a requirement that cannot be waived by agreement or conduct.
The notice requirement is absolute because setoff normally comes
without warning and can frustrate the commercial plans of the
person against whom it is effected. The burden of the requirement
is thought to be slight compared to the benefits it can produce.
Moreover, making the requirement absolute prevents overreaching
by commercially powerful lenders who routinely might require
their borrowers to waive notice.
Parties can appoint agents to receive notice, but notice to such
agents will not discharge the requirement of subsection (a). It will
merely be an additional duty under subsection (d). If the rule were
otherwise, a lender could require its borrowers to appoint an agent
for the purpose of setoff who is friendly to the lexider. Such a situa-
tion is unacceptable because it would emasculate the notice
requirement.
177. This section adopts, with modification and clarification, the rule expressed in Baker
v. National City Bank, 511 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1975). The Baker three-step test requires: (1)
a decision to exercise the right of setoff; (2) some action to accomplish the right; and (3)
some record evidencing that action. Id. at 1018. The procedure adopted here impliedly re-
quires intent through the mandated notice. The notice also operates as an overt act. Unlike
Baker, however, the bookkeeping entry, although necessary to an effective setoff, may follow
the moment setoff becomes effective. The notice itself satisfies any need that may exist for
immediate evidence that the setoff right has been exercised.
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Nevertheless, someone must be appointed to receive notice for a
corporation, association, or large partnership. Sending notice to the
president, board of directors, or managing partner may be appro-
priate for small organizations, but is clearly unacceptable as a uni-
versal rule. Although the Act does not state expressly, notice will
be sufficient if sent to the person most directly connected with the
creation of the debt to be set off, such as the signatory on a deposit
account or contract.
Notices properly addressed, prepaid, and sent by telegraph,
telex, express mail service, or by first class United States mail for
domestic delivery, as proper and effective under subsection (b).
The provision is, however, not so limited, and approves expressly
of any other similarly reliable transmission method. A notice is ef-
fective despite no actual delivery, if the service by which it was
sent is sufficiently swift and reliable. Of course, if the person ef-
fecting setoff learns of the failed delivery and neglects to take rea-
sonable steps to ensure that notice is received in a timely manner,
he may have violated the obligation of good faith. Cf. § 105.
Subsection (c) imposes a requirement, not in the common law,
that persons effecting setoff accompany their setoff with payment
of that portion of their debt remaining due that is matured, fixed,
undisputed, and liquidated. This requirement was included not to
penalize or discourage the use of setoff, but to make the private
right a more complete resolution of the parties' dealings and fur-
ther obviate the need for judicial involvement. This requirement
was not imposed on insolvents, who are defined in section 101(29)
of the Bankruptcy Code, because it would have severely limited
their ability to effect setoff. The requirement was not placed on
banks because maintaining their depositors' funds available for
withdrawal seems sufficient, indeed preferable, for those depositors
with one or more drafts in circulation.
In the event a portion of the remaining debt is unmatured, con-
tingent, disputed, or unliquidated, cf. § 202(b), a statement of the
exact facts rendering the debt not yet due, or subject to dispute as
to liability or amount, must accompany the setoff notice. This
statement will bind the person sending it, focus the parties on any
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remaining differences between them, and thereby promote further
settlement. Moreover, it limits court inquiry during a subsequent
suit.
Subsection (d) permits contracting parties to require other acts
or events before setoff will be effective. These acts may include a
particular means of sending notice, additional written or tele-
phonic notice, the passing of a specified amount of time after dis-
patch, or receipt of the required notice. In any event, the require-
ment of subsection (a) remains unaltered.
§ 205 Time Limitations
Setoff must be effected before the debt owed to the person effect-
ing setoff is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. When,
however, the debt owed to the person effecting setoff arises out of
the same transaction or occurrence as the debt owed by the per-
son effecting setoff, setoff may be effected any time before the
debt owed by the person effecting setoff is barred by the applica-
ble statute of limitations.
COMMENT
This provision is intended to make setoff subject to the statute
of limitations which governs the debt owed to the person effecting
setoff. It also addresses the situation in which two debts arise out
of the same transaction or occurrence and the applicable limita-
tions period runs after the date a complaint is filed by one of the
creditors but before the other's answer is due. This section adopts
and expands the common-law equitable rule that recoupment will
be allowed to prevent or reduce a judgment for the plaintiff in such
a situation (but not for affirmative relief). In other words, a debtor
may now counterclaim for an obligation barred by the applicable
statute of limitations if the debtor was sued before the statute ran
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out on a related claim17 8 or may simply effect setoff to the same
extent.
178. See C. WRIGHT, LAW oF FEDERAL COURTS 393-94 (3d ed. 1976), and cases cited
therein.
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ARTICLE III - EFFECT OF SETOFF
§ 301 Constitutes Payment
(a) Exercising the right to setoff shall constitute payment
of the debt owed to the person effecting setoff to the
extent such debt is netted out.
(b) Exercising the right to setoff shall constitute payment
of the debt owed by the person effecting setoff to the
extent:
(1) Such debt is netted out; and
(2) If payment accompanies the notice of setoff, the
amount of such payment.
COMMENT
This section makes clear that effecting setoff (when the right to
do so is available) operates as if the portion of each debt set off
actually had been paid. Coupled with section 204, which governs
when and how setoff is to be effected, this section may prevent a
person against whom setoff was effected from validly declaring a
default on the obligation giving rise to the debt due him. For ex-
ample, if Tenant owes Landlord his periodic rent obligation and
Landlord owes Tenant on some other obligation (promissory note;
partial leaseback, etc.), Tenant may effect setoff and, if his exercise
of setoff was proper, Tenant will not have defaulted on the pay-
ment obligation in his lease.
§ 302 Further Relief
Exercising the right to setoff shall not affect, modify, or impair
the rights of any net creditor to seek and obtain further recovery
from the net debtor for any portion of the debt owed by the net
debtor which was not set off.
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COMMENT
The exercise of setoff should not in any way limit further recov-
ery or restrict other rights and should not operate as an election of
remedies, even in those jurisdictions that require such an elec-
tion.179 A contrary rule would overly burden the right.
§ 303 Discharge of Others
Unless otherwise agreed, neither exercising the right to setoff nor
failing to exercise such right when available shall discharge any
surety, co-obligor, or security for any debt.
§ 304 Payment After Setoff
(a) If, after receiving notice of setoff, a person. receives
payment of all or part of the netted-out debt owed to
him, he shall be liable for and, within a reasonable
time, shall refund such payment.
(b) (1) If, after setoff, the person effecting setoff receives
payment of all or part of the netted-out debt
owed to him, he shall be liable for and, within a
reasonable time, shall refund such payment.
179. Several jurisdictions treat setoff as an election of one of two or more exclusive means
to collect a debt. See Woodruff v. California Republic Bank, 75 Cal. App. 3d 108, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 915 (1977); Forastiere v. Springfield Inst. for Say., 303 Mass. 101, 20 N.E.2d 950
(1939); Melson v. Bank of New Mexico, 65 N.M. 70, 332 P.2d 472 (1958); Zion's Sav. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Rouse, 47 P.2d 617 (Utah 1935).
Most jurisdictions, however, have no such rule. See Jensen v. State Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 6-7
& n.9 (8th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Tri-County Bank, 415
F. Supp. 858, 869 (D.S.D. 1976); Bee Jay's Truck Stop, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 86
Ill. App. 3d 7, 407 N.E.2d 755 (1980); Nietzel v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 307
Minn. 147, 238 N.W.2d 437 (1976); Frank Briscoe Co. v. Suburban Trust Co., 100 N.J.
Super. 431, 242 A.2d 54 (1968); Blust v. Yonkers Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 260 A.D. 947, 23
N.Y.S.2d 512 (1940); Keller v. Commercial Credit Co., 40 P.2d 1018 (Or. 1935); Harper v.
First State Bank, 3 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc.
v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash. App. 530, 518 P.2d 734 (1974); cf. In re Saugus Gen. Hosp.,
698 F.2d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1983) (under Massachusetts law, setoff allowed only to the extent
the creditor reasonably believes his security is inadequate).
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(2) Payment received by a net creditor after such
net creditor effected setoff shall be conclusively
presumed to be payment of the net debt, and not
payment of the netted-out debt, to the extent
such payment does not exceed that part of the
net debt which is undisputed as to liability, liq-
uidated in amount, fixed as to all contingencies,
and matured as to time.
COMMENT
Although subsection (a) applies to all persons and should be so
construed, it deals primarily with banks that effect setoff against a
customer by sending the proper notice but who then fail to debit
the customer's account and permit the customer to withdraw funds
from the account or checks drawn on the account to clear.
The drafter considered making such payments after setoff a rev-
ocation of setoff, but such a rule was thought both to be unneces-
sary and to present priority problems. Moreover, unless carefully
restricted, such a provision might give creditors too much power,
entitling them to unilaterally revive a debt and any commensurate
default on that debt after having effected setoff. That might per-
mit such a creditor to pursue other default remedies under circum-
stances in which that result would be unfair.
Some part of the debt owed by the person exercising setoff may
survive the notice of setoff and any accompanying payment, for
example, a disputed, unliquidated, contingent, or unmatured por-
tion, or the amount by which the debt owed by the person exercis-
ing setoff exceeded that owed by the other person. In such a case,
payment after setoff may constitute payment of all or part of that
net debt (possibly as an offer to resolve a dispute or liquidate a
claim or because of a subsequent maturing of the debt). This sub-
section does not resolve whether a post-setoff payment constitutes
payment of all or part of the net debt or payment of all or part of
the debt netted-out. This result is simply a matter of intent. Each
case must be judged on its own peculiar facts and the evidence of
intent available and otherwise admissible. Of course, the amount of
a post-setoff payment may be highly suggestive of which debt was
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being paid, and any statement accompanying the payment nor-
mally should be considered binding and fully determinative.
Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) is the inverse of subsection (a).
As with subsection (a), payment need not come from one of the
parties to the setoff; it may come from any person purporting to
act for the benefit of one of the parties to the setoff. Refund should
be made to the transferor of the payment.
Unlike subsection (a), paragraph (2) of subsection (b) presumes
that a post-setoff payment to a net creditor effecting setoff is pay-
ment of all or part of the net debt. This presumption is conclusive
and does not require that the post-setoff payment be made after
notice of setoff is received. In this way, the presumption is simply
an extension of the self-help which this Act promotes. Were no
presumption created, the net creditor simply could set off his re-
fund obligation against any part of the net debt which remains
available for setoff. Including the presumption as structured
merely removes the necessity for additional notice and permits the
net creditor to apply to the net debt any post-setoff payments re-
ceived from third parties.
§ 305 Improper Exercise of Setoff
(a) Except as provided below, any attempt to effect setoff
in circumstances other than those provided for above
or to an extent greater than that permitted above, is
invalid and without effect to the extent such right was
unavailable.
(b) Setoff shall not be improper merely because the debt
owed to the person effecting setoff is disputed by one or
more primary obligor. Only if such dispute is reasona-
ble, held in good faith, and correct as a matter of law
shall the exercise of setoff be improper.
(c) An improper exercise of setoff shall not, in and of it-
self, subject the person attempting to effect setoff to
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liability. Such person shall, however, remain liable on
his debt and shall be liable for any resulting or conse-
quential damages proximately caused by the failure to
pay his debt in a timely manner.
COMMENT
Subsection (a) merely provides that, to the extent an exercise of
setoff is improper, it fails to extinguish either debt. It also covers
the technicality that if an attempted setoff is wholly improper, sec-
tion 302 will not be invoked. In such a situation, the attempted
setoff is completely void and presumably cannot operate as an
election of remedies in those jurisdictions that require creditors to
pursue only one or a limited number of collection techniques.
Subsection (b) recognizes implicitly the unfortunate commercial
reality that disputes about liability on a debt often arise in the
absence of good faith, for purpose of delay, or without a substan-
tial basis in law or fact. Such disputes do not make an exercise of
setoff improper. Even when a reasonable factual or legal basis for
the dispute exists, unless that dispute ultimately prevails so that
the debt is extinguished, reduced, or otherwise modified, setoff will
not be improper. This rule avoids the necessity of determining
when a reasonable basis exists to support a losing claim and is sup-
ported by the probability that such use of setoff is not likely to
have injured the person disputing liability.
Subsection (c) provides that the rights granted in this Act can-
not serve as an independent basis for recovering damages. 180 How-
ever, the underlying failure to pay a debt when due can support a
damages award. For example, if a bank wrongfully effects setoff
against a depositor, the reduction in the deposit account balance
reduces the amount available for the depositor to draw upon and
can operate as a failure to timely pay a debt. Dishonor of a draft
because setoff lowered the deposit account balance below the level
180. Cf. Barnhill v. Robert Saunders & Co., 125 Cal. App. 3d 1, 177 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1981)
(penalty for failing to pay wages inapplicable due to reasonable belief in availability of
setoff).
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necessary to cover the draft can then generate resulting or conse-
quential damages for which the bank would be liable.
Moreover, although subsection (c) does not create a cause of ac-
tion, it does not insulate a wrongful setoff from liability for tor-
tious interference with business relations or other causes of action.
If the conduct involved in improperly attempting setoff satisfies
the elements of a tort, and if the necessary collateral circumstances
and damages are present, liability will accrue.181
§ 306 Good Faith
(a) Any good faith attempt to effect setoff shall operate as
a proper exercise of setoff for the purpose of sections
302 and 303.
(b) For the purpose of this section, setoff is attempted in
good faith if not prohibited by agreement and if no-
ticed without actual knowledge of or reason to know
that:
(1) The person against whom setoff is attempted dis-
putes his liability on the debt he owes;
(2) The person against whom setoff is attempted dis-
putes the amount of the debt he owes; or
(3) Some event has occurred or act has been per-
formed which fulfilled a contingency and ren-
dered unavailable for setoff the debt owed by the
person against whom setoff was attempted.
COMMENT
Section 105 governs the general obligation of good faith for the
commercial dealings involved in setoff transactions. The definition
181. See South Cent. Livestock Dealers, Inc. v. Security State Bank, 551 F.2d 1346, 1351
(5th Cir. 1977).
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of good faith in subsection (b) here is limited in effect to subsec-
tion (a): it does not govern the general obligation of good faith.
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ARTICLE IV - PRIORITY
§ 401 Holder in Due Course
Nothing in this Act shall in any way limit the rights of a person
qualifying as a holder in due course pursuant to § 3-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
COMMENT
This section was taken from section 9-309 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. That provision makes clear that a filed financing
statement provides insufficient notice to prevent a person from ac-
quiring the rights of a holder in due course. Similarly, the mere
fact that the holder of a negotiable instrument knows or has reason
to know that the maker or drawer of such instrument may have
setoff rights against the drawee or against any prior holder does
not prevent such holder from becoming a holder in due course. Cf.
§ 3-304 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
This provision is a logical extension of the principles underlying
article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code and is added merely to
avoid confusion. It is justifiable not only as a protection for the
free marketability of negotiable instruments, but also as a matter
of equity. The maker or drawer of a negotiable instrument, by re-
cording his obligation in such form, creates the potential for gener-
ating an innocent holder in due course. As such, his rights should
not defeat the rights of such a holder. Moreover, the maker or
drawer is in the best position to know his own need for setoff
rights, and can protect himself by refusing to create a negotiable
instrument.
However, if a person otherwise qualifying as a holder in due
course knows or has reason to know, prior to his acquisition of the
negotiable instrument, that the maker or drawer has already exer-
cised his setoff rights, then such holder's recovery on the instru-
ment will be limited to the amount not discharged through setoff.
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See §§ 1-201(27), 3-302(1)(c), 3-304(1)(b), 3-305(2)(e) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.182
Finally, this section does not copy that part of section 9-309 of
the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with bona fide purchasers
of a security or those to whom a negotiable document of title was
duly negotiated. This omission is not meant to imply that this Act
affects the rights of such purchasers and holders. Instead, their
rights ordinarily do not conflict with setoff rights and therefore
mention of them was deemed unnecessary.
§ 402 Garnishment and Judgment Liens
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a garnishor of a
mutual debt shall be treated as an assignee of such
debt, with service of the writ of garnishment constitut-
ing receipt of the notice of the assignment; the gar-
nishee may effect setoff to the extent authorized under
section 203(b) (2).
(b) A judgment creditor acquiring a lien by operation of
law on debts owed to the judgment debtor shall be
treated as an assignee of such debts. Any person owing
a debt to the judgment debtor shall be deemed to have
received notice of the constructive assignment on the
latter of: (1) the creation of such debt, or (2) perfection
of the judgment lien. Persons owing a debt to the judg-
ment debtor may effect setoff against the judgment
creditor to the extent authorized under section
203(b) (2).
COMMENT
Subsection (a) covers a garnishor who is not also a judgment
creditor with a perfected lien. The subsection is necessary in the
182. Apparently, this result remains true under the draft revisions to article 3. See DRAFT
AMENDMENTS, supra note 167, §§ 3-302(1)(b), 3-305(1)(b).
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event a prejudgment writ of garnishment is issued or a judgment
lien is not perfected properly through appropriate filing.
The subsection adopts in large measure the prevailing common-
law and statutory rule that a garnishor acquires no greater rights
in the garnished property than those his debtor had. 83 It permits
the garnishee to set off of any mutual debt, otherwise qualifying
for setoff, which arises before service of the writ of garnishment.'
It also permits setoff of mutual debts arising out of the same trans-
action or contract, even if service of the writ of garnishment pre-
cedes such transaction or contract. For example, if the garnishee is
involved in a automobile accident with the garnishment defendant
after the writ of garnishment is served, claims arising out of that
accident can be set off against each other. Similarly, if a bank
makes a loan to the garnishment defendant after service of a writ
of garnishment, requiring the defendant to make new or additional
deposits in exchange, the bank may set off such defendant's loan
indebtedness (provided it meets requirements for setoff in section
202(a)) against the bank's debt on such new or additional deposits.
Subsection (a) also permits a garnishee to set off any debt owed
it by the garnishor arising after the writ of garnishment is served.
This unlikely scenario effectuates essentially a three-way setoff, re-
ducing or extinguishing: (1) the debt owed by the garnishee to the
garnishment defendant; (2) the debt owed by the defendant to the
garnishor; and (3) the debt owed by the garnishor to the garnishee.
183. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text; see also Almi, Inc v. Dick Corp., 31
Pa. Commw. 26, 34-35, 375 A.2d 1343, 1348 (quoting old common law for the point that
service of a writ of attachment "has the effect of an equitable assignment of the thing
attached").
184. If the debt does not otherwise qualify for setoff, for example because it is unma-
tured, the garnishor's rights would defeat the setoff rights of the garnishee. This result is
contrary to the current law in several jurisdictions. E.g., Bee Jay's Truck Stop, Inc. v. De-
partment of Revenue, 86 11. App. 3d 7, 13, 407 N.E.2d 755, 760 (1980); Hoffman Chevrolet,
Inc. v. Washington County Nat'l Sav. Bank, 297 Md. 691, 696, 467 A.2d 758, 761 (1983). Yet,
the result accords with the current law in several others. E.g., Washington Loan & Banking
Co. v. First Fulton Bank & Trust, 155 Ga. App. 141, 143, 270 S.E.2d 242, 244-45 (1980);
Prince v. West End Installation Serv., Inc., 575 S.W.2d 831, 832-33 (Mo. App. 1978); Almi
Inc. v. Dick Corp., 31 Pa. Commw. at 34-35, 375 A.2d at 1348; see also Walker v. Carolina
Mills Lumber Co., 429 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (setoff lost to garnishor when debt
to be set off was contingent).
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Finally, subsection (a) does not permit the garnishee to set off
the debt it owes the garnishment defendant against a debt such
defendant owes the garnishee that arises after service of the writ of
garnishment. This result is necessary to prevent collusion between
the garnishment defendant and the garnishee. It also comports
with a treatment of setoff as a security interest. In such a situation,
the setoff/security interest would have arisen after the writ of gar-
nishment and therefore should not prime the rights of the
garnishor.
Subsection (b) is little different from subsection (a), and all the
potential uses of setoff under subsection (a) apply here as well. 8
This subsection merely changes the operative moment of the con-
structive assignment to the latter of the perfection of the lien or
the creation of the debt. Again, this provision comports with the
treatment of setoff as a security interest.
§ 403 Security Interests
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), a credi-
tor's setoff rights shall, upon attachment, have the sta-
tus of a perfected security interest in the debt owed by
such creditor.
(b) In the case of mutual debts arising from the same
transaction or occurrence, a creditor's setoff rights
shall, upon attachment, have the status of a properly
perfected purchase-money security interest in the debt
owed by such creditor.
(c) Where a person has perfected, through possession, a
security interest in a debt, the setoff rights of the obli-
gor on such debt shall, upon attachment, have the sta-
tus of a properly perfected purchase-money security
185. The subsection therefore adopts the rule of Gambino v. Culp, 485 So. 2d 512 (La. Ct.
App. 1986), which prevents a garnishee from effecting setoff with a debt owed it by the
garnishment defendant which arose after the garnishor's judgment lien.
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interest in the debt owed to such obligor if, at the time
such obligor became a party to mutual debts:
(1) such obligor had no actual knowledge of the se-
curity interest; and
(2) no financing statement covering the security in-
terest had been filed.
(d) a creditor's setoff rights shall attach at the first instant
when:
(1) such creditor is or becomes a party to mutual
debts; and
(2) the debt owed to such creditor satisfies the re-
quirements of section 202(a).
COMMENT
Subsection (a) codifies into state law the bankruptcy treatment
of setoff rights as a security interest. It also operates as a compan-
ion to section 203(b)(2), preventing assignments, whether outright
or for security, from priming pre-existing setoff rights. This latter
function is accomplished through section 9-312(5) of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Pursuant to that provision, "[c]onfficting secur-
ity interests rank according to priority in time of filing or perfec-
tion. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the
collateral or the time the security interest is first perfected, which-
ever is earlier .... 186
Thus, if setoff rights attach prior to the perfection or filing of a
security interest in one or more of the debts subject to setoff
rights, the creditor with setoff rights will have priority over a credi-
tor with a security interest in one or more of such debts. On the
other hand, if the security interest is perfected or a financing state-
186. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1978). Paragraph (5)(b) will have no application because setoff
rights are never unperfected security interests.
[Vol. 30:51
THE PROBLEMS WITH SETOFF
ment filed prior to the time setoff rights attach, the secured credi-
tor wins the priority dispute.
Similarly, if an account is pledged as security for a loan, that
pledge will not prime any prior setoff rights of the account debtor,
although setoff rights attaching after a financing statement cover-
ing the account is filed18 7 will be primed. Of course, the filing pro-
vides notice to the account debtor of the security interest, thereby
permitting the account debtor to refrain extending credit or mak-
ing a loan to the account creditor. If the extension of credit pre-
ceded the filing, but setoff rights did not attach at that time be-
cause the debt owed by the account debtor had not yet matured,
then presumably the account debtor was not relying on his setoff
rights to collect. Even if the extension of credit were in reliance on
the future availability of setoff, such setoff rights will take subject
to the secured creditor. Any other result would require a creditor
secured in accounts to notify all the account debtors in addition to
filing a financing statement. This result would be quite burden-
some for a creditor secured in many accounts, particularly ac-
counts which change daily, and may interfere unduly with account
financing.
Subsection (a) also protects a creditor who is secured in proceeds
that have been deposited in a bank or otherwise transferred into a
debt owed to the debtor. In such a case, the setoff rights of the
bank will necessarily attach after the security interest in proceeds
attached. As long as the security interest in proceeds is perfected
pursuant to section 9-306(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
debtor's unilateral action of depositing such proceeds in a bank
with setoff rights will not prime the security interest, at least not
to any extent greater than the insolvency limitation in section 9-
306(4) (d) (ii). s8 Whether this insolvency limitation provision
187. Perfection can never precede filing because perfection in an account must be accom-
plished through filing. See id. § 9-302.
188. The policy behind § 9-306(4)(d)(ii) is unclear. The provision apparently replaces
common-law tracing rules. Maxl Sales Co. v. Critiques, Inc., 796 F.2d 1293, 1300 (10th Cir.
1986); Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance Corp., 491 F.2d 1288, 1291 (7th Cir. 1974); In re Inter-
mountain Porta Storage, Inc., 74 Bankr. 1011, 1014-15 (D. Colo. 1987).
1988]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
should be removed from the Uniform Commercial Code is an issue
not addressed by this Act but one which warrants consideration.
Nothing in subsection (a) impairs the protections provided in
section 9-307 of the Uniform Commercial Code for buyers in the
ordinary course of business.
Subsection (b), in conjunction with section 9-312(4) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, gives setoff rights priority where the mu-
tual debts arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. This
result protects financing arrangements in which both debts are cre-
ated at the same time from the rights of creditors who may be se-
cured in certain after-acquired collateral. The debts created in
such a transaction are not likely to be relied on by the secured
creditor when it previously extended credit.
The subsection also applies to protect other types of mutual
debts. For example, if two parties to an automobile accident are
injured and thereby acquire claims against each other, no creditor
of either of those parties will be able to defeat the setoff rights of
the other party.
Note that section 9-312(4) gives priority to a purchase-money se-
curity interest over a previously perfected security interest only if
the former is perfected "at the time the debtor receives possession
of the collateral or within ten days thereafter." 189 However, with
regard to setoff rights, this clause is necessarily satisfied by the use
of the phrase "properly perfected." This rule is necessary for two
reasons. First, no tangible collateral exists for the debtor to re-
ceive. Second, a contrary rule would only cause problems. For in-
stance, if the clause in section 9-312(4) means that the rights of the
creditor must attach, pursuant to subsection (d), within ten days
after the debtor acquired the mutual debt owed to it by the credi-
tor, then the automobile example above would be incorrect. In that
case, the debts will not likely become fixed or liquidated (and
therefore not attach under section 403(d)(2)) until long after they
otherwise accrue. Accordingly, the last clause of section 9-312(4)
189. U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1978).
[Vol. 30:51
THE PROBLEMS WITH SETOFF
does not apply to setoff rights having the status of a properly per-
fected security interest.
Subsection (c) covers any security interest in a debt perfected
through possession, as authorized by section 9-305 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. It is specifically intended, however, to address
the situation in which a certificate of deposit is pledged to someone
other than the issuer as security for a debt owed by the purchaser.
Security interests in such instruments are ordinarily perfected
through possession, which provides no actual or constructive notice
of the pledge to the issuer. If the issuer then extends credit to the
purchaser, relying on setoff rights in the certificate of indebtedness
as security, the issuer's rights should defeat the rights of the se-
cured creditor, who could have avoided the loss by providing the
issuer with notice of its security interest. For simplicity, reliance is
presumed conclusively when the issuer had no actual or construc-
tive notice of the earlier pledge.190
In many respects, this provision treats a security interest in a
debt perfected through possession as an assignment of that debt,
leaving the obligor all the setoff rights described in section
203(b)(2). Unlike an assignment, however, which generally restricts
setoff rights to those debts arising before actual notice is received,
this provision restricts setoff to those debts arising before actual or
constructive notice is provided. This distinction was necessary to
avoid undue interference with the effectiveness of financing state-
ments, which, like possession, can be used to perfect a security in-
terest in chattel paper.
190. Although a creditor cannot ordinarily perfect a security interest in an instrument by
filing a financing statement, see id. § 9-304(1) and, therefore, instrument obligors and other
commercial players have no cause to search for such filings, see supra note 145, permitting
creditors to impose constructive notice in this manner does not appear incongruous. After
all, subsequent to the adoption of this rule, an instrument obligor who, when extending
credit, truly wishes to rely on that obligation and the setoff rights potentially connected
therewith, will know to search the relevant repository of such records.
A financing statement filed against an instrument previously assigned may lie outside the
apparent chain of the title (i.e., if no notice of the assignment was given to the instrument
obligor). Obviously, financing statements filed outside the apparent chain of title cannot
provide constructive notice, particularly because the creditor could just as easily have actu-
ally notified the instrument obligor.
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Subsection (c) does not impair the rights of a holder in due
course, which are expressly protected in section 401.
